As Ms. King so aptly explains, the phrase “three cups of tea” has been adapted from the Greg Mortenson best-seller of the same name by the American military as the basis of how to conduct a counterinsurgency campaign.

The concept is a good one: win the trust of the people and they’ll tell you who are the bad guys. In a country whose central government is known worldwide for corruption and incompetence, building local governments that can protect their own townspeople makes sense. “Counterinsurgency is easy,” said Col Dale Alford (USMC) at last year’s COIN Symposium at the National Press Club, “you want to make the locals choose us.” It worked with the Marines and Sunni’s in Ramadi and Anbar; it should work in Afghanistan.

But any plan is only as good as it’s implementation—and that bring us back to the photograph : two soldiers sitting at their desk in an office looking down at Afghans who are sitting far away from them on the floor. This is hardly how Gen James Mattis (USMC)  and Gen David Petraeus (Army), co-authors of the Army-Marine Counterinsurgency Manual, envisioned building relations with the locals.

Mattis knew how to deal with a wary population. “Take off your sunglasses,” he ordered his Marines back in 2003 Iraq, “and let them get to know you. Play soccer with the kids, and don’t worry if you lose. Shake a lot of hands and chat them up.” Sound, effective advice until Paul Bremer’s ill-planned CPA took charge and Iraq exploded with I.E.D.’s.

Marine-Afghan Shura in Garmsir, attended by author Andrew Lubin.

What the Army fails to understand is that it’s not how many cups of tea one drinks that’s important, but that the act of drinking tea or sharing a melon is how strangers sit down peacefully and begin to know one another. Afghanistan is an incredibly poor country; perhaps the 5^th poorest in the world, and sharing food is the ultimate in hospitality. It’s also worth noting that relationships are not built in a day, neither here, or in Afghanistan. Similar to most dating rituals worldwide, it takes more than one cup of tea and more than one meeting, to build a relationship sufficiently deep to talk honestly about schooling, IED’s, and Taliban presence.

It’s fair to say that bureaucracy and counterinsurgency are incompatible. Living on a FOB and patrolling by vehicle ensures you meet no locals. Eating at the DFAC means you’re not eating with the locals, and it’s worth noting that ten months after President Obama ordered more troops into Afghanistan, the Army has yet to deploy their final thousands of troops. Air conditioned bunks, Wii in the MWR, fast-food joints, an MWR shop…while creature comforts are certainly attractive, creature comforts keep them tied to the FOB’s.

In comparison, the Marine forces in Helmand and Nimroz Provinces live in or in close proximity to the towns.  They have limited internet access, very little a/c, and no Wii. In Musa Qual’ah, they live in the village center. In Marjah, they live on some ten different little patrol bases. In Nawa and Garmsir, considered the success stories of COIN in Afghanistan, they live in and around the towns. Relationships and trust are built by constant exposure to each other, and the Marines patrol 3x daily 7 days/ week. Ms. King goes on to quote the ranking elder of a village who mentioned that American soldiers visited him ‘last month’, and how he doubted that “an occasional visit by the American forces could keep the insurgents at bay.”

It’s been written that the Marines out-patrol the Army by a factor of perhaps 20-1, hot, tiring work in a country jaded by nine years of broken Western promises. Yet done properly, as Mortenson’s book and Marine efforts in Helmand Province evidence, personal relationships can bring two disparate cultures together for mutual success. With American assistance, they’ll build enough functioning local governments that will enable our troops to come home.

But then one needs to regularly be in the village talking to the elders in order to build that kind of relationship.

==========

Andrew Lubin is an 11x embedded journalist who writes extensively on Iraq and Afghanistan. He is also the author of the award-winning “Charlie Battery: A Marine Artillery Battery in Iraq”

“This is not how the war is supposed to be going. . .”

So, why isn’t the war going as planned? Maybe we should assess the counterinsurgency effort from President Karzai’s perspective and focus less on our Americo-centric point of view.

What is President Karzai’s counterinsurgency strategy?

President Karzai’s “clear-hold-build-consolidate” approach to counterinsurgency is mostly political. Politics in counterinsurgency is about the distribution of power and political strategy all about influencing the will and actions of both your allies and adversaries.

Afghanistan is a place where you fear your friends as much as you fear your enemies.

To “clear” the field of competitors in Kandahar, President Karzai installs his brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai to administer the province. Ahmed Wali Karzai enters into relevant patronage relationships with local families to “hold” and control the territory. The members of Ahmed Wali Karzai’s newly established patronage network then “build” and “consolidate” control.

The Karzai administration now controls Kandahar.

If President Karzai trusts his brother to expand his patronage network in Kandahar, could this be why the local administration and Kabul are less than enthusiastic about our proposed military operations in the area?

President Karzai, through his brother Ahmed Wali Karzai, is also allied with Matiullah Khan in Uruzgan province. Matiullah Khan controls the northern approaches (trade routes) into Kandahar City and staging areas into Hazara territory. His militias will eventually be integrated into the central government security forces (if history is an indication for how local strongmen are integrated into the state security apparatus).

Now, let’s take it one step further. President Karzai is also allied with Nangahar Governor and Karzai loyalist (for now) Gul Agha Sherzai. Gul Agha Sherzai continues to undermine the local poppy economy and now controls the distribution of development aid to assist in consolidating his position and power in the province. A major trade route connecting Kabul, Jalalabad and Peshawar in Pakistan is located in Nangahar province.

President Karzai is presently engaged in direct and indirect negotiations with select Taliban factions to exploit the movement’s more ambitious leaders and inherent rivalries.

I personally give President Karzai a hell of a lot more credit for how he is managing his “clear-hold-build and consolidate” strategy than his naysayers. But then all that is needed to bring peace to Afghanistan and for the Karzai government to be considered legitimate is for him to eliminate corruption, distribute basic services and to administer the rule of law equitably amongst all Afghans—just like we do in the United States. . .

According to both, in late January, select elders of the Shinwari, a Pashtun tribe in eastern Nangarhar province, approached U.S. military officials and offered to confront militants operating in their territory. They would also punish anyone who cooperated with the militants. In response, U.S. military officials decided that they would allow the leaders of those fighting the militants to help decide how the approximately $1 million in U.S.–funded development projects would be spent.

The idea that a select group of local leaders might help decide who would benefit from U.S. development funds caused an immediate reaction from rivals and accusations of a local power grab with the support of the U.S. military. The Governor of Nagahar Gul Agha Shirzai accused the U.S. military of turning local elders into “little governors.” But don’t be fooled. Governor Gul Agha Shirzai understands the importance of “little governors” especially since he and the Karzai administration are pursuing a “little governors” strategy to expand and consolidate their influence in the province.

The Karzai administration’s “little governor” strategy is deeply embedded in Afghan culture. Empires and dynasties are born through the recruitment, cooption and consolidation of urban and provincial aristocratic, merchant and martial networks. In today’s political vernacular, the central government seeks to legitimately dominate the periphery by imposing a central authority or by co-opting the loyalty of provincial commercial and security networks. While conquest is an option, the preferred method is to co-opt the loyalty of the provincial elite and their commercial and martial networks.

Noah Coburn, in Connecting with Kabul, explains that many of those interviewed for his study defined the word “government” as the executive branch, and “parliament” as a means for local power brokers to oppose executive power and to challenge the status quo. Coburn’s study further explains that all power in Afghanistan is local and based on personal relationships rather than an impersonal Weberian legal-rational, bureaucratic authority.

We actually assume that an Afghan government exists because we say it exists. President Karzai is under no such illusion. The Karzai government understands that it is engaged in a process which seeks to monopolize the control over violence and resources and impose organizational hierarchies on disparate social networks. President Karzai is not the defender of an existing legal order but is imposing a new order. President Karzai’s “little governors” strategy therefore has little to do with Western notions of rule of law, or imposing impersonal governance and legislative procedures on a compliant population. It has everything to do with eliminating, replacing or co-opting local patronage networks.

The application of the “little governor” strategy since at least the late nineteenth century.

• The Amir Abdur Rahman Khan (1880s) extends his authority through the manipulation of tribal and personal rivalries. He becomes a source of patronage and by strategically supporting one Khan against another alters the existing regional balance of power in his favor.
• Ismail Khan, (1979–1992) consolidates his power by establishing a loyal security force and then co-opts the local patronage networks by the targeted distribution of supplies to his supporters. He successfully shifts the balance of power in the area away from the local strongmen and assumes the military-political leadership in Herat.
• President Najibullah in early 1987 announces his national reconciliation program. His intent is to weaken the opposition by instigating and managing factional rivalries and buying the support of one or the other of the mujahedin organizations engaged in fractional fighting.
• Since 2005, the Karzai administration has administered Kandahar province through President Hamid Karzai’s brother Ahmed Wali Karzai. Ahmed Wali Karzai enters into alliance with local power brokers to gain control over key trade routes and commercial and security networks. He integrates local power networks and state institutions to manage political and commercial activities and to retain formal control over the province.
• President Hamid Karzai reassigns Governor Gul Agha Sherzai to Nangahar province in 2005. The Karzai administration expects Governor Gul Agha Sherzai to exert his authority by integrating local power networks and state institutions. The first thing that Governor Gul Agha Sherzai does to establish himself in Nangarhar is to gain control over the local economy. He does so by eradicating the poppy economy. Instead of growing opium, local farmers will receive development aid from the provincial government. Governor Gul Agha Sherzai has successfully undermined local commercial networks and now controls the distribution of development aid to his supporters and leveraged to punish his distracters.

Conclusion: Personality-driven political orders are the norm in Afghanistan and the “little governor” strategy embedded in Afghan political culture. As such, it might actually make sense for the U.S. military’s engagement strategy to poke the local power broker and manipulate the local balance of power every now and then so as to encourage the “little governors” to become a more credible servant of the people they purport to represent.  

I personally witnessed many of the same characteristics highlighted by Coburn in the patronage networks of the Anbar tribal awakening movement while serving as the Tribal Advisor to the Multi-National Forces-West in 2005-2007.

Coburn explains:

• Afghan parliamentarians are first and foremost members of local patronage networks, which include formal and informal leaders.
• Patronage networks in rural Afghanistan are not strictly resource or service providers. They are also about social relationships and religious obligations and reinforced through marriage, business, friendship and other social and economic ties. The emphasis in patronage networks is on personal relationships rather than on legal-rational, bureaucratic authority.
• The local patronage network judges its representatives on their ability to provide for resources from the national government and the international community.
• The local patronage network is a countervailing force to the central government. Community leaders tie into leaders of national-level patronage networks while national-level leaders rely on community leaders to rally local support.
• Struggles between competing social networks within and between communities shape and determine the power of a given patronage network.
• How can strategists, policy-makers and practitioners of population-centric COIN use this information?

Back in 1965, Andrew R. Molnar, in “Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies” described the challenges inherent in changing individual and group behavior.

Molnar explained that there exist basically three strategies to induce behavioral change.

• The easiest strategy is to demand a particular behavior toward which the population is already predisposed.
• The more difficult strategy is to demand that the population change its behavior and adopt an alternative behavior. This demand requires a clearly declared alternative and should entail a demonstrated consequence for refusing.
• The most difficult strategy is to demand that individuals or groups refrain from a particular behavior they are already pursuing and to act in a manner that sharply conflicts with the current behavior.

Here is how Coburn’s information might help us figure out appropriate population-centric strategies in Afghanistan if we first:

• Admit to ourselves that a strong central state is not the only remedy to Afghanistan’s challenges.
• Acknowledge the challenge of creating appropriate power-sharing agreements among the various ethnic groups in Afghanistan clashes with the reality of a strong-central government.
• Work within the patronage network paradigm.

Freerange International has a report up about Chief Zazai being ambushed by Pakistani Taliban this past week.

Last night as Ajmal was moving through the town of Ali Khel near the Pakistan border, he was ambushed by a platoon of Pakistani Taliban.  They recognized them as Pakistani’s due to their accents when the attackers shouted back and forth to each other during the 45 minute fight.  As these things normally are the ambush was initiated with an IED explosion followed by small arms fire (SAF) and RPG’s.  I talked with the chief of the Zazi Valley police, Amir Mohammad who said the Paki’s shot volley after volley from at least 6 RPG’s and they threw over 14 grenades during the fight.  Ajmal called on the near by Afghan Border Police for help and they declined to intervene, so the ambush was not broken until Zazi Valley tribal police reinforcements showed up and drove the attackers back towards Pakistan.  Ajmal lost a truck and had three men wounded.  One of them was seriously wounded and was being transported to Kabul (a five hour drive) in order to get him proper medical care.

If you aren’t familiar with Freerange International, check out the entire site, in addition to reading the full post about the ambush.

The archived posts for the “Interview With A Tribal Chief” series are now located on the Agora Blog.

I recently read a number of manuscripts by the constructivist scholar Alexander Wendt.

The takeaway from Wendt’s work?

The only reality that exists is the one we socially construct for ourselves and others of like mind.

There exists no one reality that can be accessed through empirical research. And, we can’t be sure that the reality we observe exists independently of our observation of it. All human associations, social identities and the interests of purposive actors, are continually shaped, and guided primarily by shared ideas and biases. Furthermore, all relations are socially constructed and given form by social practices and interactions.

Why this matters?

Often, ideas are discounted because they don’t mesh with someone else’s concept of reality. I was on the receiving end myself recently, related to my latest recommendations for prosecuting the war in Afghanistan. And, well, I’ve shot down the ideas of others in the past, too.

End of day, we have to consider the different realities—because the one thing I think we can all agree on is that, in Afghanistan in particular, there’s no one-size-fits-all solution, because the realities on the ground vary so greatly.

“Agora” is a place to consider all of the realities.

The following is another installment of the Tribal Engagement Tutorial series, written by Major Jim Gant and MAC McCallister. It is a long post, so stick with it. It describes key differences between a shura and a jirga, as well as guidance on when to call for one, how to prepare, how to act, what to say, and so on. Thank you to both of them for pulling this together.

According to NATO’s military chief of intelligence in Afghanistan, the Taliban now maintain shadow governors in thirty-three out of thirty-four provinces. While we like to see the world in black and white, the complexities of relationships and alliances in the village and valley make it anything but a straightforward contest between two parties. The U.S. strategy of stripping away Taliban loyalists is not easy in a very complex socio-political landscape. This landscape includes different types of traditional authority, local rivalries and the various configurations of social power in each village and valley.  

The rubber of U.S. strategy meets the road in the village assembly. It is in the local assemblies where Coalition Forces speak directly with the local inhabitants and indirectly with the shadow governors of the Taliban. Identifying ahead of time the familial, sectarian, security, economic and political alliances represented in a given village or valley assembly will assist in identifying how these alliances might influence group decisions. We must also contemplate, identify and differentiate between two very different village assemblies: the jirga and shura.

JIRGA

 MAC McCallister:

The jirga is an assembly of village elders and reflects the rituals of the Pashtun traditional assembly in which village and valley notables gather to discuss and resolve disputes and make collective decisions about important social issues.

What follows is a simple model of the types of decision-making makers found in the jirga. The jirga is likely comprised of three major decision-making powers: “the elders,” “those with grey beards,” and “people with white turbans” or mullahs. The grey beards are knowledgeable in “folk Islam” or narkh, i.e. customary law of the village or valley. The elder, the grey beard, and the mullah each represent a distinct center of social power. This does not mean that younger inhabitants of the village or valley are excluded from power or the decision-making process. Remember, this is a simple model. Not every grey beard is a Khan, malik, tribal chief or leader of a solidarity group. Some mullahs are closely aligned with a particular village or valley leadership, some are not. Before I am accused of overly simplifying the complexity that is the Afghan village, my advice is not to get hung up on titles. The model provides a simple framework to start you off. Watch how individuals interact with one another; listen before speaking. Apply your emotional intelligence to identify those individuals that are considered credible and legitimate voices in the community. Don’t forget that the “powerful send messengers.”

Major Jim Gant:

It is also sometimes used by other neighboring ethnic groups. Jirgas are most common in Afghanistan and among the Pashtuns in Pakistan near its border with Afghanistan. This definition comes straight from Wikipedia and is as good as any. The key thing to understand is that it is a tribal mechanism.

It is also important to note that there are three types or levels of jirgas: a maraka (local jirga), a qawmi (tribal jirga) and a loya jirga (national assembly).”

SHURA

MAC McCallister:

Shura is an Arabic word for “consultation” or “council”. The word itself can describe an assembly, an organized body of participants, an administrative body or council, or may describe a decision-making process.

Islamic scholars consider decision-making via Shura as either obligatory or recommended. The shura is considered obligatory by those Islamic scholars who choose to emphasize the Quranic verse: “…and consult with them on the matter” (3:159). The shura is recommended by those Islamic scholars who emphasize the verse “…those who conduct their affairs by council are praised” (43:38). One can’t help but notice the religious subtext when requesting that a shura be held in an Afghan village or valley.

Deciding to Request a Jirga or a Shura

MAC McCallister:

If Coalition Forces request an assembly, consider the differences in effect between calling for a jirga or shura. If you seek to focus on the legitimacy and credibility of the village elders and grey beards, request that a jirga be held.

If you seek to focus on the legitimacy and credibility of the mullah, request that a shura be held.

Since you may well be negotiating with a representative of the Taliban shadow government, take care not to inadvertently help the Taliban by adding temporal power (prestige) to the spiritual, especially if you request a shura when a jirga will suffice.

A strategy that seeks to strip away the followers of a local powerbroker requires an understanding of a very complex socio-political landscape. A mental model that informs in terms of shame and honor, segmentation, patronage and territory may help pierce this fog of complexity.

Major Jim Gant:

Ensure you understand the difference between a jirga and a shura. A shura is not purely tribal, but is a political assembly that involves representatives from different levels of government as well as the security forces.

Top ten “golden rules” of a jirga 

1. “De Pakhtu lar ba neesu”
 It means “I am speaking to you as a Pashtun”…I want to see these issues as a Pashtun…or what I call seeing the perspective of the Pashtun.
2. Keep their culture. Know the customs. Know the culture. Know the people.
3. Listen. Listen. Listen. DO NOT TAKE NOTES.
4. Never “cut” anyone off. Ever.
5. Be honorable.
6. If you think you are “better” than them (smarter, stronger, etc) DON’T GO. SEND SOMEONE ELSE.
7. Be patient. Take your watch off. “How saylah”
8. Do not make promises you cannot keep.
9. Talk slowly and only when you understand the implications of your words.
10. Pa Pakthu ba ye khalasswoo”…We will end this in the Pastun way…

Planning considerations for a jirga:

 1. Security Measures:

a. The tribal chief that you attend the jirga with must understand that you are turning your “close-in” security over to him.

b. You must accept risk here. There might be hundreds of men in and around the area that you do not know.

c. Do not “advertise” your presence with multiple armored vehicles and heavy weapons systems all over the place.

 2. Talk to your tribal chief about an agenda. Ensure it is HIS agenda, not yours.

 3. Determine who will attend with you. I attended two jirgas. I went on my own to one, and to the other, I took one man with who moved around outside and kept an eye on the site.

 4. If possible, find out the location of the site, so you can better prepare over-all security.

5. Be prepared to brief past, present, and future “accomplishments/plans” to the entire jirga, if asked. Also be prepared to answer questions about the ENTIRE U.S. plan for Afghanistan and its goals. Think this through carefully.

6. If possible, and if the chain of command supports it, you can use this as a platform to announce a new project.

Possible reasons to attend a jirga:

1. At the request of the tribal leadership
2. To establish a personal/professional relationship with the tribal leadership
3. Some type of conflict resolution
4. Discuss TET abilities and limitations
5. Discuss procedures for developing “pillars” for the tribes at all levels
6. How to improve over-all security measures
7. Discuss threat activity
8. Discuss all boundaries
9.  Establish positive US influence
10.  Discuss what THEY need
11.  Plan future projects/operations
12.  Ensure cooperation between TET and bordering tribes
13.  Emphasize “Unity of Effort” with open dialogue
14.  Plan and coordinate projects/operations in conjunction with coalition forces

Remember, the TET gains “influence without authority” through its ability to build relationships with the tribe. The personalities of the tribal chief, as well as the influential members of the tribal elders, are very important. YOU MUST BUILD REAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH THESE KEY PEOPLE.

The jirga influences tribal members or other tribes to accomplish goals by providing purpose, direction and motivation. Purpose gives the tribe the reason why; direction tells them what must be done; and motivation gives the tribe the will to do everything they are capable of to accomplish their goals, in some cases at great risk to themselves and families.

Historically, in Afghanistan tribal leaders have been recognized as leaders within a specific sphere of influence. This sphere can expand and shrink. Ensure you know where this influence is “on the ground” and over whom he has influence. The TET should then help him with any shortcomings he may have or with other issues if requested.

Within regards to conducting security and offensive operations, the tribal leader should be responsible for the following:

• Appoint or recognize subordinate Arbakai or tribal security force (TSF) commanders
• Prepare the overall plan to accomplish the mission and goals of the tribe
• Collects supplies from local sources
• Resources and supplies from external sources (the TET will advise him on their capability)
• Allocates and distributes resources to his Arbakai commanders (you should never do this. Let the tribal chief do this himself, or set up a system to do so.)

The TET MUST support the tribal chief however they can. Additional elements may or may not be available to assist the TET.

1. Never promise anything you cannot deliver.
2. Give the tribal chief what he needs and wants.
3. Do not ever “take credit” for anything. The TET does not want dependence but is striving for cooperation.

Lastly, always remember your presence gives the tribal chief legitimacy. Legitimacy is power. Be prepared: your decisions and your actions could have not only tactical effects, but strategic effects, as well.

MAC McCallister

The Shura, excerpted from “COIN and Irregular Warfare in a Tribal Society Primer“

1. Shura is an Arabic word for “consultation” or “council”. It is the method by which Arab tribes select leaders and make major decisions.

2. The term has caused much confusion for it is used extensively by tribal leaders to describe an organized body of participants, administrative body, tribal council or consultative and meditative process. In essence, all consultative bodies organized to bring tribal leaders and representatives together are called a shura.

3. For simplicity sake, a shura should be considered a higher level of tribal representational organization that includes the leaders, councils, advisors and principal lieutenants of multiple tribal groups for the purposes of consultation and mediation among tribes.

a. The Shura reflects a decision making process — consultative decision making — that is considered either obligatory or desirable by Islamic scholars. Those scholars who choose to emphasize the Quranic verse: “…and consult with them on the matter” (3:159) consider shura as mandatory. Islamic scholars who emphasize the verse “those who conduct their affairs by counsel (43:38) are praised”, consider shura as recommended.

b. A shura is an arena in which each individual tribe voices its concerns and pursues its interests and is not in the Western sense a disciplined interest group representing one party platform.

c. A shura is not a political party. If a political party is desired, members of the shura will form a political party distinct and separate from the shura.

d. Decisions are reached by consensus and reflect the ability of tribal leaders to build alliances and persuade other tribal sheikhs. ‘Ability to attract’ vice ‘enforce’. Decisions based on consensus not majority rule.

e. Persuasion, mediation and negotiation are basic tenets of tribal politics and diplomacy, not the use of force or intimidation. The shura has no “leader” in the Western sense of the word. A respected family based on lineage and bloodline will be named to act as moderator, spokesman or representative for the council.

f. Note: any dissenting tribe can decide to remove themselves from the shura, in essence “vote with its feet”, and form its own shura.

g. Identifying the networks of familial, tribal, security, economic and political relationships composing a given shura will assist in identifying how these networks influence group decisions.

 

Listening Points during visit to the tribal house/shura

a. Designate “observers” and “listeners” to gather atmospherics throughout the visit.

b. Observe and note which other sheikhs (tribes) have also been invited. Note the distance they sit away from paramount sheikh and the order in which they present themselves to him during the initial gathering. This information will assist in developing an understanding of present and potential alliances developing among the tribes.

c. Note the groupings of sheikhs as they meet and talk to each other and the general body language, and approximate length of time they converse with one another.

d. Note the groupings of sheikhs as they approach the paramount sheikh periodically to present petitions or to engage in conversation to determine which sheikhs (sub-tribes) may be aligned for specific objectives.

e. Designated listeners now listen for pledges of loyalty and or petitions that address security, political or economic issues or general exchange of pleasantries to indicate relationships.

f. Listen for concerns in regard to present provincial governance and administration/distribution of resources (patronage building).

g. Observe participant’s body language if discussion involve sectarian political parties, provincial council, and elections.

h. Observe groupings of sheikhs during discussions and note those that speak favorably and those that do not (also take note of those that do not express an opinion) concerning the subject matter of interest.

i. Observe body language and facial expressions if topic involves security, security forces and role of Ministry of Interior (MOI), Ministry of Defense (MOD) or any other central governmental agency. Pay particular attention to side-bar discussions.

j. Designated observers judge body language and facial expressions (after translation) of comments made by U.S. military representative. Especially “key” comments crafted by the U.S. military representative designed to make a point, recommendation or achieve a specific effect.

Sun Tzu wrote:

Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be defeated.

How do you know if you have the correct understanding of your opponents and allies, as well as an understanding of how your own world plays into your understanding of others?

We put this question to Major Jim Gant and William “MAC” McCallister.

 Mental Models

MM: Mental models are assumptions about the world. A mental model describes events and gives meaning to cause and effect relationships. It predisposes us to act in certain ways and to expect certain results. Our mental models filter information (called selective perception) that influences our approach to problem solving and the way we use information.

Each soldier and Marine must recognize and appreciate the fact that we see the world based on our own unique culture, attitudes, emotions, values and authority. As a member of an expeditionary force you will encounter people and cultures that differ markedly from our own. The hardest task is to lay our cultural lenses aside and to gain an appreciation of the “others” cultural operating environment.

JG: Our personal mental models are a result of our past experiences and current knowledge, and determine how we will act or respond toward any given situation. Our perception of events or data that we internalize, gives life to our actions. As an example, an academic’s idea of tribal engagement, which has evolved from reading history and experiences of others, will be much different those who have lived, fought, and built relationships as ODA 316 did with Sitting Bull and his people. Being immersed in the cultural, day-to-day living and experiencing the heart and soul of a people is much different than reading about it. More information and experiences will modify and change a person’s mental model about any given topic.

MM: At some point, we’ve all had the great pleasure of being chastised by the enlightened few for “getting it wrong” because our life experiences don’t agree with or reflect some great thinker’s notion of what the world “ought” to be. We become trapped by personal mental models when we focus on how the world “ought” to be. We have to focus on the way it is.

JG: We can’t assume that we know the motivations behind the way people act, but we can assume that motivations exist. In Afghanistan, there are century old tribal conflicts that are hidden only because of greater, outside threats. These will reemerge once one of the contenders [US vs AQ/TB] begins to take a commanding lead. How aware of these alliances are we when we pick our friends? What is the why behind the how different tribes fight? Within ourselves, we also have to consider our own cultural operating codes. For instance, there are tactical, operational, and strategic models.  Now, these models will overlap, and variables at one level can have a major impact on other variables at other levels. How do these, in turn, mesh or clash with the tribes on the ground?

MM: The cultural operating codes (cultural op codes) and coordinating messages (coord messages) mental model is based on the premise that from simple rules emerge complex social dynamics and, over time, distinct patterns of behavior. They are simple assumptions for “how” an area of operation (AO) works and identify the “why” that shapes cause and effect relationships. The two coord messages are “what have you done for me lately and what will you do for me tomorrow?” and “no stability without us.” These communicate intentions to cooperate or compete. Structuring the analysis by applying the four cultural op codes and two coord messages provides for a more fitting appreciation of the human terrain and supports the tailoring of strategic initiatives and operational and tactical tasks.

The following is a story from Captain Thomas Daly, a Marine who was in Ramadi during the Awakening. Watch for the operating codes and the coordinating messages: 

Three months into my deployment in Anbar’s capital, Ramadi, I sat at what I thought was just another battalion-level mission confirmation brief. My first six battalion-sized operations into insurgent-controlled patrol sectors weren’t very successful. They were characterized as clear or sweep missions and they didn’t do much to reduce the 20-to-30 attacks a day against coalition forces, or stop IEDs from being planted at an alarming rate. Even when we detained the military-aged-males at our target houses, less than 5% were prosecuted.

However, this was not just another mission. When 1/9 Infantry’s battalion commander reviewed our list of targeted individuals, he directed us to detain the regional sheikh. Then he instructed us to find and recruit the sheikhs of the regions neutral sub-tribes (none of them were considered friendly at the time). As the company’s intelligence officer, which was a duty obtained by direction, not training; I was surprised to receive these tasks. Previous missions were focused on target buildings, i.e., who may or may not be in them. There was no thought to local atmospherics or who the local power holders were. That was left for somebody at battalion or brigade to figure out. We simply cleared the objective areas, detained suspicious individuals, and transferred them over to military intelligence at the end of the mission. Yes, we found insurgent caches and engaged the enemy when he revealed himself, but in terms of reducing violence we were not having any success.

A couple of days later, we executed the first-large scale operation focused on the populace, not the enemy, in our deployment. We successfully created a power vacuum by detaining the al Qaeda controlled sheikh of the region. Two days later we allied ourselves with a small group of ex-Baathist fighters. Our combat effectiveness immediately increased. With their assistance, 95% of our detainees were being prosecuted. We detained the #2 HVI for Anbar province. And, at the same time, violence sky rocketed. Our casualties began to mount, but so did the local populace’s. Al Qaeda was determined to figure out who the masked Iraqis assisting us were so they brutally interrogated members of the surrounding sub-tribes. It was a colossal error. They lost the support of the people. Two months after our first mission focused on the populace, those same citizens revolted against al Qaeda. A week of brutal Iraqi-on-Iraqi violence encompassed the region. When it was all said and done, al Qaeda was gone. 

Once the Marines of 1/9 Infantry started to think in terms of local atmospherics, they intuitively began to communicate intent within the target audiences’ cultural frame of reference. The operational objective was to reestablish governmental authority. The supporting tactical tasks were to ‘isolate’ the insurgent alliance network, ‘disrupt’ or sever the patronage relationship, and enlist the ‘relevant population’ to assist U.S. and Iraqi government security forces in the area.  The Marines did this by exploiting the tendency of rival groups to segment by aligning themselves with ‘a small group of fighters’ and the community these fighters represented to fight against al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). The local fighters sought to reclaim ‘territory’ lost to AQI and its local allies. The Marines strengthened this alliance via a patronage relationship. The shame and honor code served as the framework to exchange credibility, legitimacy and prestige between the Marines and the relevant population.”  

The following is excerpted from Mr. McCallister’s “COIN and Irregular Warfare in a Tribal Society” primer:

a. A mental model is an explanation of someone’s thought process for how something works in the real world and based on culture, attitudes, emotions, values, authority, persuasion and or coercion.

b. Each soldier and Marine must recognize and appreciate the fact that we see the world based on our own unique culture, attitudes, emotions, values and authority. As a member of an expeditionary force you will encounter people and cultures that differ markedly from our own. The hardest task is to lay our cultural lenses aside and to gain an appreciation of the “others” cultural operating environment.

c. Define to what extent you understand your own mental process. How good are your insights in how you weight evidence in making judgments.

• Studies show that individuals assume an implicit “mental model” consisting of fundamental beliefs and assumptions. These fundamental beliefs and assumptions for sake of mental model development are called variables.

It follows that:

• An individual should be able to identify and describe the mental variables they consider most important in making judgments. 
•  Cognitive studies show that individuals tend to overestimate the importance of variables that have only a minor impact on their judgment and underestimate the extent to which their decisions are based on a few major variables.
• In short, people’s mental models are simpler than they think.
• As a matter of fact it is seldom more than one or two mental variables that are considered at any given time when assessing a given situation 
•  This revelation helps explain why additional information does not normally improve predictive accuracy. We tend to confirm or deny information in accordance with our existing mental model.  
• Accuracy of judgment depends almost exclusively upon precision of the mental model for there is little other basis for judgment.

 d. Describe your own mental model. An example of a very simple mental model is Boyd’s Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA) Loop.

e. What are your mental variables when you contemplate events in Iraq or Afghanistan; provinces or tribal society?

f. Which variables influence your mental model for how you see, perceive and experience the culture of the operating area?

Mental Model Development

The social contract defines the limits of power and social responsibilities between individuals, groups and governance. It is the logical start point to gain an appreciation for the distribution of power in a given society and the critical first step in determining how best to shape behavior.

Social Contract

• The social contract is an implied agreement by which people form nations and maintain social order.

• It is an agreement by which individuals and groups give up rights to a form of government so as to secure social order.

• Tensions exist between governmental sovereignty, communal autonomy and individual liberty.

• The social contract does not provide for rights that are “natural” or permanent. Rights are only legitimate to the extent that they serve the general interest

• Arguments can be made for a natural right of rebellion in case the social contract leads to tyranny.

• Fighting is a form of negotiation.

Political Formula

• The political formula is the logical beginning and foundation of a political order. The entire legal and social structure of the state is built upon a specific political order.
• No political formula can be scientifically proven to be correct. Every political formula is fiction. Only the force which the political formula exerts and expresses as political faith is real. The political formula is taken to be correct, true and necessary by those who believe in it and uphold it.
• A political formula which does not correspond to the desires and efforts of the people is useless. Those who rely on the political formula’s legitimacy and associated force lose their power i.e. that influence which allows them to impose their will.
• A political formula without legitimacy is mere legality. Yet, the political formula seeks to survive by virtue that it exists. 
• Legitimacy is derived from differing political formulas which the various actors seek to realize. Every revolution bequeaths legitimacy once its political formula is believed.

 U.S. political formula  

• The American political formula is based on the idea that authority is derived from “the people” and that everyone who belongs to this order is called upon to participate. This participation is expressed in elections and votes in which the decisions of the majority are delegated to the appropriate authority, according to directives from below.

 It follows that:

• The government represents the will of the people and is held accountable for its actions.

It further follows that this mental model might assume that COIN and irregular warfare is primarily a struggle between:

• The government fighting against the insurgency for the hearts and minds of the people.

 Political Formula in a tribal society

a. The primary building block is the group, not the individual.

b. Competition for access to limited resources and influence is between a multiplicity of compact groups – ethnic, sectarian, economic-and tribal all striving separately and suspicious of each other.

c. The state as an institution and the territory it encompasses represents a “political field” or arena in which groups compete for influence and resources. It is a power-sharing system that includes urban and rural, sectarian, political and tribal groupings.

d. The focus of each group is to survive and prosper and they can do so only if they preserve and reinforce the corporate pattern.

e. The focus is on the tribe or the community of interest. The tribe or the community of interest succeeds or fail as a group.

f. Community of interest is defined as any temporary or long-term alliance to achieve a common goal.

Key Points

a. Does the current mental model of “the” government fighting against “the” insurgency for the hearts and minds of “the” people express the stylized way of fighting and peacemaking in Iraq or Afghanistan?

b. Does the current COIN and irregular warfare mental model support the development of appropriate tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) to accomplish your operational and tactical objectives within the cultural frame of reference of the target audience?

Our mental model provides the foundation for appropriate action. If the mental model clashes with the cultural operating environment then you should change the mental model to better reflect the cultural frame of reference of the target audience.

While this blog will continue focusing on that debate, the greater focus will be on providing soldiers and Marines practical, battle-tested information, which can help them on the ground. 

A few weeks ago, Newsweek reported:

Maj. Gen. Michael T. Flynn, coauthored a refreshingly candid and very public report that said, among other things, that the “U.S. intelligence community is only marginally relevant to the overall strategy” in Afghanistan. (Among his views: there’s too much emphasis on intel for killing bad guys, and not nearly enough on information to help soldiers understand what’s really going on in the society.)

William S. “MAC” McCallister (USA, Ret.) underscored:

We may be focusing too much on specific questions and not enough on adapting our mental models to reflect the cultural environment and identifying cultural operating codes and coordinating messages. One of the challenges with our current intelligence collection and assessment process is that we delve too much into the minutiae and miss the bigger picture or patterns of social behavior. It is an appreciation for the patterns of social behavior not answers to specific questions that allow us to predict and shape an outcome. There are places in the world where the past, present, change and continuity coexist in the same social space. Our intelligence collection and political and military strategies should express this condition.

We asked Major Jim Gant, Mr. McCallister, and Chief Ajmal Khan Zazai what information they would provide to the soldiers and Marines on the ground. For what information should our troops be asking-and what information should they be questioning? What is it we believe to be true about the rest of the world, that just ain’t so? 

Major Gant mentioned that some of this information is passed on from unit to unit in “continuity books.”

The purpose of a continuity book is to ease the hand-over from one unit to another in conducting their mission. It is very detailed and covers every aspect of the mission and the area of operation (AO). It usually will go from very general to very specific in case there is a change of mission and so that there will be a depth of understanding about the AO that will allow the incoming unit to “hit the ground running.” The better the continuity book, the quicker the new unit will be able to start being successful and the less time they will waste in “getting their feet wet.”

The goal for this “Tribal Engagement Tutorial” series is to provide the atmospherics portion of the continuity book, as it relates to tribal engagement. There is much more that goes into a continuity book. This series will cover one portion. 

And, as Mr. McCallister pointed out:

In my opinion, all questions concerning a given AO are situation based. We should also gain an appreciation for how the social system in our AO works. Questions concerning my AO will differ from someone else’s because of location, situation, mission, enemy activity, and personalities involved, etc. This is about “how to think” versus “what to think” about an AO. 

Keep that in mind, too. This series will offer information that must be approached from specific AOs. This is a starting place. 

Though their answers were different, they shared the same core:

1. People

a) What are the critical groups in the area of operation (AO)—tribes, aqwams, and ?

In a lot of cases it is very difficult to determine who is who. We have gotten better at that, however, in remote areas (as ODA 316 was in 2003) it was very difficult to determine if who you were dealing with who was/is THE tribal leader or a clan leader or what. Go in with as much information as you can about ALL the groups in your AO…CF, Afghan forces, tribes, enemy, “fence sitters”…etc

—Major Jim Gant

b) What are their populations?

c)What are the cultures, traditions, and social structures? How do they use Jirgas or Shuras? What form of law do they follow—Shari’ia, Pashtunwali, and/or government-imposed law? What are their importance holy and historic days? How do they treat the different sexes—what are their customs/mores? What are their dietary habits? What are their traditions related to birth and death?

It is always very helpful to mention in every meeting that the US Army is in Afghanistan to help the Afghan people, they are not there to go against their culture or religion. It is always helpful for the officers to provide a praying area during the praying time (Muslims pray 5 times a day).

—Chief Ajmal Khan Zazai

“Just asking the question about how they handle, for instance, a murder is very important to know because you can determine a lot about the tribe based on how they deal with punishing crimes. For instance, do they follow “Pashtunwali”? A Shar’ia law? Or do they try to put the person into some type of local government judicial system. This tells you a lot about who really owns the power in the area.”

—Major Jim Gant

d) How do they identify themselves and what are the inter, and external dynamics among these groups? What are the names of the tribes, clans, sub-clans? What are the tribal dynamics? Who are the leaders? Do their mullahs and other influential elders play a role in governing the tribe? If yes, how much? What is the historical origin of the tribe? What is the focus of their history? As warriors? As Muslims? As Pashtuns? What portion of their history do they identify with the most? History is very important to the tribe. The more you know about the history of the tribe, the more you will be able to not so much anticipate certain reactions, but narrow down the many reactions that MAY occur to certain situations.

e) Who else is operating in the AO? Foreign Nation support? Central government representatives? Other solidarity groups? Insurgents? Which of these groups are friendly and which aren’t? How do these other groups play into the tribe?

Many local elders and tribal chiefs get intimidated by the Insurgents. When, and if, they cooperate with U.S. Army, there has to be an approach by the U.S. Army in order to make sure some meetings takes place very quietly and some publicly. Many Tribal Chiefs and elder would wish to meet with the U.S. Army officers in private and inform them of situation in their villages, towns and valleys, but because sometimes these meetings are taking place in a public manner, they keep quiet.

—Chief Ajmal Khan Zazai

If possible, put into place mechanisms that will allow the tribesman to speak with you in a non-conspicuous manner. Never “visit” just to gather information. In most cases, if you are working with them in the correct manner, you will have more information than you will know what to do with.

—Major Jim Gant

One of my base assumptions about the frontier is that there already exist mechanisms and established rituals (procedures) for managing violence, patronage relationships, alliance networks or in this case communicating inconspicuously. We need to identify, mimic and or adapt these existing mechanisms and rituals (procedures) so we might effectively communicate our intent to the locals.”

—MAC McCallister

2. Alliances

Which groups are allies (alliance networks and or patronage relationships) or rivals, and which ones are actively feuding? Who are their leaders? How do their leaders operate? Veiled threats/insults? Straight talkers? What is their history with the central government, with insurgent groups, and with coalition forces? How have they worked with Americans and other Westerners in the past? How have they used their credibility and legitimacy to enhance prestige and/or create new alliances and strengthen existing alliances. Once you determine which other tribes they cooperate with, and which other tribes they are at odds with, you will have a great amount of information on their true intentions. *REMEMBER: These intentions can change over time based on YOUR actions/inactions.

3. Geography

Where are the key market towns and vital trade routes in our area of operation? What tribes border the TET’s AO-tribes which might be working with separate TET’s.

This is one of the questions I am asked most often. TETs would not infil into bordering tribes without the “approval” of the tribe that was contacted initially. If a TET were to infil into an adjacent tribe, the elders of each tribe would meet with the TETs and there would be clear AO’s established and agreements would be made that would ensure that all the tribes involved were satisfied with the arrangement.

—Major Jim Gant

If I might add to Major Gant’s answer concerning a given TET’s area of operation. A TET would most likely be initially associated with a specific solidarity group or alliance network. Patronage relationships shape alliance networks and afford solidarity groups access to limited resources (honor, guns and money). Security is a commodity. Specific territories are associated with alliance networks and patronage relationships. The term territory does not have to imply physical territory only. A given territory may be a patchwork of sub-loyalties within a system of solidarity groups rather than an area of physical territory with a precise boundary. An aligned TET would therefore be unable to infiltrate a different alliance network without the expressed approval of all parties involved. A TET may be able to cross network boundaries if a given alliance network links into a greater network.”

—MAC McCallister 

 4. Security arrangements (segmentation)

What currently exists between the various aqwam, and for protection of key market towns and vital trade routes? Are there Tribal Security Forces (TSF)? If yes, where are they, what are their training and capabilities, their systems and armament, and their disposition?  

In future posts, we’ll break out points in the above, an go through them in depth, with Major Gant, Mr. McCallister, and Chief Zazai weighing in, providing their opinions and examples of their experiences with these various points.

We’d also like to hear from you. If you have experiences that relate to the topics we’re discussing, please post them in the comments section, following the appropriate post.

Mangwel and the Konar River Valley

[Friends, with apologies, a stomach virus has laid the blog low.  Here's a re-run of a post that has been a reader favorite. We'll be back on Wednesday!]

June 22nd, the Washington Post ran an excellent article by Greg Jaffe, titled “A Personal Touch in Taliban Fight.” The piece is about a young Army captain, Michael Harrison, and his up-close-and-personal work as a company commander in the remote tribal villages of the Konar River valley in Afghanistan.

Flashback to 2003, same valley, same U.S. Army—different captain. This is the story of then-captain Jim Gant of Las Cruces, NM, and how he and Capt. Harrison are linked by a gift of honor, a 12-gauge shotgun.

A tribal chief

Mangwel is a village in Konar province, close to the border with Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province. Terrain is mountainous, no paved roads; Taliban fighters use the valley regularly as an infiltration route to and from Pakistan. The chief in Mangwel is Malik Noorafzhal. He’s 86 now; he fought the Soviets in the 80s; he’s been defending his tribe’s turf all his life.

In 2003, Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha 316–twelve men, led by Capt. Gant–had Mangwel as part of its area of responsibility. The ODA helped the chief in some tribal warfare, fighting alongside him. The chief said he would return the favor to augment the ODA’s mission; he mentioned that he could deliver 8 men with guns, then upped it to 80. On 23 April 2003, Capt. Gant had a meeting with him and other tribal leaders. The following is from the captain’s OPSUM [Operation Summary], written immediately afterward:

The head local we have named “Sitting Bull.” He is an old, old warrior. He didn’t speak much. I didn’t speak much either. I mainly listened. I looked him in the eye often. After the meeting was adjourned, he asked to speak with me privately. So my terp [interpreter] and I went out back with him. He took my hand in his. “I want you to know, Commander Jim, that you have my loyalty. If you need men with guns you come see me.” He promised 800. From 8 to 80 to 800!

Bonding tribe-to-tribe

Capt. Gant made it a point to bond with Sitting Bull. This nickname that the ODA gave the chief captures the spirit of their affection and admiration. These tough Special Forces soldiers regarded the malik as a living figure of legend, a warrior who had fought and defeated many enemies, a leader to whom the highest respect was due. They loved to question him about his battles with the Russians and he loved to tell them his stories. The warriors, American and Afghan, would stay up deep into the night, drawing maps of ambushes and infiltrations. Capt. Gant had his own father, James Karl Gant, send Malik Noorafzhal a knife with “Sitting Bull” engraved on it—and a letter, man-to-man, father-to-father. Here is part of it:

My son says you are a great warrior. He respects you and considers you to be his friend. He tells me that your enemies are his enemies. He says he would give his life to protect you. Be my son’s father while he is in your country. Take this gift from us as a token of our friendship.

Through his interpreter, Captain Gant read the letter to the chief.

When I read [the letter] to Sitting Bull, he was outwardly moved by it and said, “Tell your father not a hair on your head will be harmed as long as you are with me, you are now my son.”

Sitting Bull, the shotgun and Capt. Gant, 2003

A gift of honor

Capt. Gant and the ODA wanted to give the chief their own gift of honor. They searched and found a beautiful 12-gauge shotgun. The photo on the right shows the moment they presented it. That’s Capt. Gant beside the chief. Up front is SFC Mark Read.

Flash forward to 2009, a few weeks ago. Marine Col. Bing West, author of The Strongest Tribe, about Marines in Iraq, is now in Afghanistan researching a book. He visits Mangwel and meets with Malik Noorafzhal. The first thing the chief does is to bring out, proudly, the gift shotgun and ask Col. West if he can get him some shells, as he is all out. The photo below tells everything. Bing West e-mailed it to now-Major Gant, who forwarded it to me. The young officer next to Sitting Bull is Capt. Michael Harrison—the company commander profiled by the Washington Post–who is now on his second tour in Konar. Here is part of an e-mail Capt. Harrison sent from there to Major Gant, 18 June 2009, a few days ago.

Over the past five months, he [Malik Noorafzhal] has helped us out tremendously. His son and son-in-law both work at our COP [Combat Outpost] as ASG [Afghan Security Guards.]

Sitting Bull, the shotgun and Capt. Harrison, 2009

Tribesmen relate man-to-man

Men of the tribes never forget an insult or a kindness. Six years later, Capt. Gant and ODA 316’s heartfelt gift of honor is paying dividends for follow-on generations of American soldiers. And Capt. Harrison (though he and Maj. Gant have never met) is employing the same tribal language of man-to-man, person-to-person bonding. From Greg Jaffe’s article in the Washington Post:

Between his two tours, Harrison, whose boyish face and blond hair make him look like an especially earnest grad student, had kept in touch with his interpreter and several of the Afghan leaders from his old sector via e-mail. He sent them packages of T-shirts, jeans and toiletries. Soon after he arrived in Konar for the second tour, Harrison bought mosque speakers for the religious leaders in his area. Although his current sector is a three-hour drive from his old base, Afghans whom Harrison hasn’t seen since 2007 sometimes arrive at the gates of his new base. Many show the guards scraps of paper bearing Harrison’s signature, proof that they once knew him. “You cannot come to me, so I am here to visit with you, my good friend,” one man told Harrison.

All this is not to say that life is roses today in Konar province. Successes are unfortunately the exception, and tribal-savvy breakthroughs like those produced by Capt. Gant and Capt. Harrison are, so far at least, only the model for achievements to come.

Tribes and Alexander the Great

When Alexander fought in the Afghan kingdoms 2300 years ago, a gift of honor might be a horse or a Damascene sword. Alexander understood that such tokens, presented man-to-man, warrior-to-warrior, were the currency of tribal alliance. The celebrated tale of Alexander marrying the Afghan princess Roxane is usually told as a romance–the youthful king smitten by the ravishing damsel. There may be an element of truth to this, but Alexander was also a shrewd political animal whose army was then mired in a disastrous three-year counter-insurgency campaign with no end in sight. He married his way out of that quagmire, by taking to wife the daughter of his most powerful foe, the warlord Oxyartes, thus making his enemy into his father-in-law.

That marriage was an act of honor. In tribalspeak it said to Oxyartes and the other warlords, “I honor you as an equal, you have fought me to a draw and won my respect; let us make war no longer but join our two peoples in a peace whose issue will be prosperity and happiness for all.”

A shotgun and a bride, a gift and an act of honor. Perhaps the Obama era’s young officers and men, incoming now to Afghanistan, can take a page from Alexander and Oxyartes, from captains Gant and Harrison, and from a chief called Sitting Bull.