These MM’s can be attributed to some officers continuing inability to overall adapt to a different environment that requires different tactical goals, operations and strategies than a necessarily conventional war. Furthermore, with the advent of a military designed to be ‘network’ oriented, these preventive commanders have a greater ability to micromanage and restrict their subordinates from making the necessary tactical-strategic decisions. (See P. Singer’s book Wired for War for more detail on this ‘techno over control’)

Making the rounds this week with Steve and Chief Zazai, talking with a lot of smart folks in the DC area and without getting into any detail at all at this time (and I talk about this in the paper) the goal of tribal engagement is to clear and then secure large portions of the south and east ((and the south will be different and more difficult than the east)) of Taliban and AQ. Once the tribes are “secure” (and they will do that very quickly with very limited support), we can then move on and do ALL of the things we are currently trying to do…whatever that is, good governance, infrastructure development, education enhancement, CA projects, work for pay, etc…and all the while this is going on, the TET will be putting PILLARS in place to support the tribe, so that when/if (big if) the central gov’t can ever provide anything for the tribe, “systems” will be in place to accept them. At the same time, as a TET team leader, I will be looking for opportunities to set the central gov’t up for success and report those up the chain of command. The goal of tribal engagement from an Afghan central gov’t perspective is to give them (and the ANA/ANP as well as the every day Afghan) TIME AND SPACE from the violence and coercion of the Taliban/AQ.

The goal of tribal engagement on a very large scale is not to supplant the central gov’t, but make the central gov’t reach out to the tribes. If that does not happen, whatever we do in Afghanistan – will fail.

A large scale tribal engagment strategy, if done by the right people, with the right support, and the right “top cover” is a “game changer” and would happen much quicker than anyone can imagine right now. It is NOT without pitfalls and difficulties, I know this. If the ANA/ANP was “good enough” would the Taliban/AQ have such easy access to the population? Do we think we are going to be able to build that capacity in the next ten years? Do we have ten years?

I believe the right men (very few for that matter) could have great “influence without authority” over much of the south and east region in less than two years. And this effort would have long-term sustainablility potential. Our other option, it would seem to me, is to put all our chips in with the central gov’t and the ANA, and leave the tribes out. This will end in failure – and I wonder how many of us americans would vote for that option if it were our kid’s lives we were betting on…

If I get a vote, I’ll bet on the tribes, thanks.

But, then again, I am no expert. Just one guy, who has seen what ten guys and one tribe can do.

STRENGTH AND HONOR

Jim Gant

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/31/weekinreview/13rohde.html?ref=world

In the context of this post, one’s Mental Model is also influenced by your own innate ability to be back off a bit and view all your data as objectively as possible so you can assign each data point it’s own value on this gradient scale. I’d say this ability is usually is not often used. After all, my mother always told me, “(favorite hate target) are really bad and shouldn’t be allowed to be around.”

The ration of perceived/measured IQ isn’t necessarily a measure of this ability, either. Generality: I’ve known quite a few people who operate quite intelligently, but have tremendous blind spots in which they do zero evaluation.