I think you see in Mr. Lubin’s other post where I stand in regard to the long-term aspects of our commitment. I’m not sure if America’s presence in Germany or Japan are good parallels, but Alexander and the Persian armies that invaded Greece certainly are. Sure, Alexander and Xerxes brought the warriors of conquered peoples into their own ranks, but it was far from “assimilation” on some far fetched “Star Trek Borg” level. They were typically more than happy to let Afghan cavalrymen and Egyptian chariots ride according to their own tactics within the greater strategy. In essence, fight your way, but make sure you hold your end of the line. You could say that they had less of a unified army than they did a “comprehensively-partnered force”.

That’s what I think would succeed with the ANA and ANP. The crucial aspect of this is ensuring there are strong leaders within the Afghan forces to make sure the troops do, in fact, hold the line.

I think the corruption issue is a top-down situation, but we have an incredible opportunity with the ANA to cleave the beast in half even as we continue to wrestle it at the neck. If the ANA can be imbued with capable and honorable officers and NCOs, then it can serve as a vital go-between for the people and the government. It can be the “man on the ground” providing security for the people and legitimizing the new (and hopefully righteous) “man in the big office”, thus taking a big bite out of the ignominious reputation currently casting a shadow over things in Kabul.

And that’s why I believe we shouldn’t rush to let the Army fight now as Lubin argues. Like you said, the process will take time, and trying to cut corners only means you have to go back and fix mistakes later. It’s trading one step back in the future to get two steps forward now. There are no doubt countless tactically proficient fighters out there in Afghanistan. Our responsibility, and a boon to great success, lies in the patience to make fighters into responsible and obedient soldiers, and from that into honorable warriors.

“Go and tell the Afghans”, you might say. And who better to tell them than their own countrymen?

Do I think building an Afghan National Army and an Afghan National Police is important? Without question – yes – if we are interested in long-term “nation-building” and “capacity-building”. Being able to do this becomes a critical task if we want “Afghanistan” to be able to stand on its “own two feet” per se…but I ask: How long have we had troops in Germany? Korea? The Phillipines? Japan? Columbia? Etc…Building this capacity is a very long-term comittment and one that atleast until this point has been under-resourced and under-manned. There are some extremely capable Afghan units out there. Look at the Afghan Commando Program. In 03-04 the CTPT elements I worked with were hands down the most capable “indigenous” units out there. Can it be done? Yes. Should it be done? Yes. We just need to make sure we are doing it in such a way that it can sustain itself for the long haul…and the question is – can we do that?

STRENGTH AND HONOR

Jim Gant

Hope all is well. I have some very strong opoinions about the ANA and the ANP, but will not get into them in great detail here. I preface my remarks by saying I volunteered to go back to Afghanistan and work on a transition team in Afghanistan mainly becuase I believed I could make a difference with the ANA and the ANP at the tactical level and also with this: The situation in Afghanistan is so complex that it boggles the mind. The east, the south, the north, and the west are completely different. To make things even more difficult, even within those areas, the strengths and weaknesses of each “tribe” or “group” or “valley” or “region” or “city” is different. Their motivations and fears are all different. There is not one answer or one strategy that will achieve “success” in Afghanistan (even a tribal engagement strategy (TES) will not work as a stand alone strategy nor will it work in every part of the country or even within the same tribal group; it will be different wherever it is applied). That is what makes the overall problem so difficult. There are 15 to 25 different strategies with 15 to 25, or even a hundred different results that have to be applied and accepted. “One strategy fits all” will not work, which makes it a very difficult situation.

And once again, if one does not believe that tribes are central to our success in Afghanistan and if one does not believe that Pashtunwali is a real and current “code” in use by the Pastun tribes, then continuing to read this is a waste of time.

So to answer your question, I will say two things:

First, the policy to recruit, then train an “Afghan” and then move him out of his “area” to work in another province or somewhere other than where he grew up is not a good idea, in my opinion. The reason this is not a good idea is because of the Pastunwali code of “ghayrat” and “nang”. My experience, research and study is, as you know, with the Pashtun tribes, specifically in the Konar (I think I can say the “east” and be comfortable with that). In the tribal people that I have dealt with, being a warrior is the center-piece of their existance and their society. They will fight ANYONE that they percieve as a threat to them, their family, their sub-clan, their clan, and their tribe. Now in a broader sense, they will fight for “Afghanistan” in really only one situation – when they are allowed to fight locally. When you take these tribesman away from their tribe, where their “ghayrat” (physical bravery) and “nang” (honor) cannot be seen or even talked about by their tribe and family…why do it? What are they fighting for? An “Afghanistan” that does not exist? A central gov’t that most “Afghans” (and Americans) see as corrupt? It just doesn’t make sense to me.

The last comment above leads to my second point. In most cases (not all) the central gov’t is seen as corrupt. Therefore, there policies and actions are also viewed that way. So, how is the ANA and ANP as a part of that apparatus viewed? Corrupt. As much as I believe that the COIN fight will be won from the ground level – up – I also believe that the corruption problem has to be dealt with from the top – down. This is where one of the most difficult problem is…how do we “help” the central gov’t with the perception that is corrupt? Our gov’t is not perfect and I would venture to say that a vast majority of the decisions our gov’t (at all levels) makes is about money and politics. How much does it cost? Will it hurt my chances to get re-elected? But I also believe that a vast majority of our poloticians do what they do out of a sense of “public service”, therefore even when decisions are made for political reason there is very little (in most cases) personal or monetary gain involved. That is generally not the case in Afganistan. I said all that to say this – the perception of what the ANA and ANP stands for has to change; and that is going to take a long time.

The “locality” and the “corruption” issues are two of the reasons that I believe “arming, advising and assisting” the tribes – is the way to go – atleast in some parts of the country.

Take care and have a good one. I didn’t mean to get so long-winded!

STRENGTH AND HONOR

Jim Gant

If you agree with Randy’s point here, I wonder how you feel about Andrew Lubin’s assertion that paying the Afghan Army soldiers more will sway more troops out of Taliban ranks and onto our side of the fight. My feeling is the money makes people who were already on our side believe that the pay is worth the risk, but it does nothing to change a tribal warrior’s allegiance. Your opinion?

Thank you for writing…You obviousely know what you are talking about and thank you for your service and the risks you have faced. I would say that all of the reasons that you mention above make it even clearer to me that we must “become” them. Your comment, “there is no amount of infrastructure development which will make the Pashtun people turn from their brethen and side with the “infidels” from the west…” I completely agree with…100%, if we keep doing “business as usual”. Therefore, I believe we must assimilate ourselves into the tribes through the use of TETs so we can better understand and help them flourish…help them flourish, literally one tribe at a time.

Thank you again for your time.

Have a good one. Just my simple thoughts.

STRENGTH AND HONOR

Jim

The Pashtuns are the world’s largest (patriarchal) segmentary lineage ethnic group. The total population of the group is estimated to be around 42 million of which about one half or perhaps a little more live on the Pakistan side of the “border”.

The Pashtuns move from Afghanistan into Pakistan and back again without any consideration as to the separation of each country-their tribal heritage is their “country”. As such, until which time ISAF and our coalition partners can also “win the hearts and minds” of all the Pashtun’s will some permanent peace come to South and Southeastern Afghanistan.

Frankly, what metric or historical marker can we use to validate building schools (staffed by whom) or clinics (again staffed by whom) will result in the locals not supporting(involuntarily or voluntarily) the Taliban (as defined: those who seek religious knowledge-plural-Talib means religious student-singular).

How does a family react when a cousin comes across the border from Pakistan to “free” his oppressed people from the coalition and western powers..so says the propaganda from nearly all of the religious schools in Pakistan? Does the family attempt to “convert” the cousin or simply assists in a passive manner without endangering their own family?

This assertion includes those who fight us because of criminal trade, ideological differences or simply on the “bad guy” payroll. I can recall in eastern Khost looking up at the mountain and seeing thousands of opium poppy blooming plants..as far as the eye could see. The fields were in perfect harmony with the sloping terrain to assist the water as it flowed back and forth down the mountain from the 11,000 foot peaks..we were at about 9,000 feet. These fields (as alleged) are owned by people who live not in the mountain villages, but Quetta, Hong Kong, Singapore and elsewhere around the work feeding on the opium/heroin trade.

These are the people who hire locals to lob those 105mm rockets propped by with rocks with pencil fuses at our FOB’s.

The proof source, at least on its face, it that logistics support for the insurgents is coming from “somewhere” to include medical… and intelligence about the movement of US forces. In short, the insurgents don’t have FOB’s, yet seem to put up a sustained “fight” whenever possible.

Lastly, I and perhaps a few others who have drank a lot of green tea and driven those hard rock roads in Paktia or Khost Province believe there is no amount of infrastructure development which will make the Pashtun people turn from their brethren and side with the “infidels” from the west. Let’s hope I am wrong…

As a guy that’s been there, I can tell you with complete confidence that the “pounding” gets accomplished in our modern COIN strategy, though not with artillery as much. That’s not a bad thing.

I’ve seen more than one comment on here assigning culpability to one political party or the other with regards to the current situation. The political statements are made, as is the disappointing fashion of our time, with great passion. It serves only to obscure the debate, because here we’re talking about warfighting. The warfighter can afford to be neither political nor passionate– he must be philosophical.

I had the unique experience of serving on the Brigade staff of two very distinct commanders in the 101st Airborne; COL Michael D. Steele (of noterieity for his heroism in “Blackhawk Down” and COL Dominic Caraccilo, whose most recent book details his leadership of that Brigade in the most deadly areas of the Sunni Triangle in Iraq in 2008. Their leadership styles stood, as much as their stature, in stark contrast to each other. Yet they were incredibly successful in what they accomplished in their missions.

COL Steele was on the 1980 Georgia Bulldogs football team, the only undefeated team in NCAA history. He stands 6′5″ and he’s got to be 300 lbs. He’s so large that it looks comical for him to carry an M4 rifle, so he carries a shotgun too. He is a man who fights to win, and only to win. On the Macchiavellian dilemma he decidedly sides with “fear”. During our time in Samarra, Tikrit, and Bayjii, COL Steele ordered the homes of several IED makers to be bulldozed to the ground and the entire city of Bayjii to have an earthern berm constructed around it to prevent weapons smuggling. We conducted the largest air assault operation since the invasion of Iraq and recovered thousands of weapons stored in caches in the desert by some of the worst insurgent fighters in Iraq. We lost 19 Soldiers that year. COL Steele was certainly feared, because the people knew he had little regard for their comfort. He did very little to help towns that continued to harbor violent men. I can do very little justice to the man’s character. I encourage you to google search “col steele speech”. The first result you get will be a Youtube video of the speech he gave prior to our deployment there. You’ll never see a more honest talk on what it means to be on the hot, hard streets of a combat zone.

COL Caraccilo is about 5′7 and maybe 160 lbs dripping wet. He’s a long distance runner, though a larger frame might help him bear the load of his enormous brain. The man has a cunning intellect, and like a chess player never makes a move without having first considered what the consequences of it will be five moves from now. He was a voracious reader of intelligence reports, something for which COL Steele was not the greatest of fans. He was less interested in the enemy than he was the population. In his mind, the enemy needed the people. The enemy required a great deal of effort just to find. The people made themselves readily available. Thus, it was best to focus effort on the people. COL Caraccilo spent exhausting hours dealing with corrupt politicians, inept police, and poorly trained Iraqi soldiers, sometimes with little gain to show for those efforts. He forced his troops to live on postage-stamp-sized outposts with no air conditioning or chow halls like the ones on the big bases, he demanded that his battalion commanders submit daily reports and call in to nightly conference calls, and gave specific guidance that he demanded be followed to the letter. I once watched him frustrate an operations officer to no end, chastising the man for giving subordinate battalions UAV coverage on a “time share basis” by telling him “I don’t care what the units want or if they don’t feel like they’re getting their fair share. It’s not about fair share, it’s about results. Resources go where they’ll produce results. When they need the resource for something they’ll get it.”

No American can hold the Afghans accountable, because the Afghans know their accountability is to a much higher power; their code, the unforgiving environment and, to an uncomfortable extent, fate. A model that demands we “give with one hand and slap with the other” fails because it’s based on a belief that we, more than those factors, can instill accountability. Our efforts can not be politically or passionately motivated to establish our brand of justice or government. They must shape the conditions of the country such that the people themselves can take advantage. Being “fair but tough” works with children because they understand adults are in charge, and will always be in charge. That’s not the case with Afghanistan. Giving responsibility back to the people isn’t “weak kneed”, it’s our ultimate objective. Simultaneously, there’s no greater motivator than to look at an indigenous force commander and tell him “see those Taliban guys I’ve been fighting for you? Tomorrow– they’re all yours!” At some point, we have to let go and start allowing them the opportunity to fail or succeed. Either way, the country will do it on its own, and that’s the key.

So…..what we (social workers) have not had was a “Marine Artillery” or a court system, or more importantly a social enforcement system with balls. God forbid we hold anyone accountable. This has, over the last 40+ years created an excuse for laziness and entitlement….a culture of celebrity/addiction/explotionation/victimization.

I worry that because the culture and attitude of victimization is so powerful in the west we will fail to pound hard with COIN….it will only work if we give with one hand and slap with the other. I’m not suggesting that the giving shouldn’t be genuine, but please don’t let the tribes rest in being “victims”. I doubt the American public, and sadly the current (or any) administration will have the courage to be tough. Republican ideology pro ports to be tough but can’t get elected being hawkish. Dems just piss on themselves trying to please everyone and continue to suggest that no one is responsible for themselves.