If I may… a). “Let us not have illusions that we “Crusaders” can win-em-over as that only wasted heroic moms and dads whose primary mission is defending the home front and raising upright well educated future Americans, not develop one-year-long tribal ties.” If you read “A Tale of Two Captains,” you will see that Major Gant and his ODAs efforts in their “one-year-long tribal ties” paid huge dividends for a regular Army Infantry Officer 4 years after those “tribal ties.” And we’re not crusaders. We’re not trying to convert anyone into christianity.

b). “These don’t last and sap our nations bleeding human and material assets as we, again, lose strategically because we only think tactically, in the end depending on airpower and firepower instead of tribal ties.” Actually Sir, I would argue that everything has gone awry because we’ve thought strategically instead of tactically. Influence starts from the ground up; one man at a time. Whether it’s at the marketplace in downtown Kabul or in the middle of nowhere with a village. It’s no different than a commander thinking he’s influencing his company solely by passing information through his platoon leaders. When he doesn’t take the time to get to know each individual soldier he’s influenced no one, to include his Platoon Leaders.

One wonders then in going native with the Pashtun is not a romantic boyish notion rather than a solution.

Trust me, the fighting and realtionship building that took place in the Konar in 03 and is currently taking place in many places in Afghanistan is a lot of things. But a romantic boyish notion?

You chose your words poorly.

When you say things like that, it makes taking the rest of what you say (which are important points) seriousely.

I guess training the ANA and ANP are also “romantic boyish notions” as well as sending in a couple hundred SOF/Agency guys to topple a 50, 000 man Taliban…that must qualify as “boyish romantacism” as well. Maybe the COP out at Wanat where nine Americans were killed can qualify? Just say you don’t agree with the policy. What is your plan? What would would you do? At any level of war – tactical, operational, or strategic? Who is your “horse” in the race?

Terry

This post was the most fantastic thing I read today. “You had better pack a lunch.” You are a warrior poet, sir, and this fight needs more of those. Earlier this morning I read the latest piece of Michael Moore bullshit at the Huffington Post, it was more small-balled than I expected, but the whine left a taint. (Politics is fucking lame.) But your post put me back on my feet. I hope you will keep writing on this blog. Daily, these ideas are continuing to gather force. With enough momentum, success becomes inevitable.

And, Mr. Pressfield, cheers to you, sir, for continuing to use the force of your brand, to advance the debate.

–Why…because big army couldn’t and can’t stand to take the back seat and let CJSOTF continue on it’s way to mission success.

–Why…Because big army’s mission has become executing the plan, rather than fulfilling the commander’s intent.

MAJ Gourley’s comments struck a nerve today, so I thought I would share my thoughts with you. .

–I see your paper MAJ Gant as highlighting a mindset and ideology more than a new tactic, and I think a lot of people are missing this fact. We as a military (everyone, not just SOF) need to open our minds up to new ways of interacting with the Afghans. Our biggest challenge in Afghanistan is that we see success as the way we do things here in the USA with three branches of government, a military with the NCOs as the backbone, etc. etc. etc., anything other than doing things the way we do them is a failure. This is a crippling mindset. What is success in Afghanistan, helping the Afghans to recover from the Soviet, Taliban and Al-Qaeda invasions so they can return to the “for the most part” peaceful and progressive life of pre-1979. But because most people have no clue as to the history of Afghanistan they can and never will get this. And lastly, MAJ Gant’s ideas really are not all that new, just phrased in a way that big army and politicians might be able to understand…has anyone reviewed the 12 SOF Imperatives lately….???
12 SOF Imperatives
1. Understand the operational environment
2. Recognize political implications
3. Facilitate interagency activities
4. Engage the threat discriminately
5. Consider long-term effects
6. Ensure legitimacy and credibility of Special Operations
7. Anticipate and control psychological effects
8. Apply capabilities indirectly
9. Develop multiple options
10. Ensure long-term sustainment
11. Provide sufficient intelligence
12. Balance security and synchronization

Response 1:

How can a headquarters keep its battlespace coordinated when so many elements are “cut loose” from it? I understand that the tribes don’t come to OPORD briefings at Corps as it is, but I’ve been in more than one situation where Special Operations Forces refused to cooperate or share information with a battlespace owner, and there’s no denying that there have been SOF SNAFUs in the past which caused local socio-political fallout. It’s hard to blame the man with the stars on his collar for being nervous when he’s going to be the one left holding the bag. What’s the balance between autonomy and accountability?

–Here was how things worked in 2003 in SE Afghanistan (Lowgar, Paktia, Paktika, Khowst Provinces) and this applied to all operators and support personnel, there were no double standards. In 2003 Afghanistan was divided up into CJSOAs (Combined Joint Special Operation Areas). Each CJSOA was assigned to an ODB/ODA and that ODB/ODA was basically what we call today the “Battlespace Commander” and they were located in their CJSOA, not back in the rear in Kabul, Bagram or Khandahar. Every time anyone rolled out of the firebase a CONOP had to be filed. If it was within a certain distance of the Firebase we only had to file a 5 line GOTWA/5 W report, which were simply filed on a daily basis before rolling out. If a mission was outside a certain distance a full 5-paragraph CONOP report had to be filed. For regular day to day (planned in advanced operations) CONOPs were filed 96 hours out, however, understanding the nature of the operational environment, if we received corroborated info on a bad guy outside the GOTWA distance, we were allowed to file an on the spot CONOP, deconfliction and notifications were given and we rolled out immediately as needed. When outside the wire we had to call and check in at each check-point you passed or every 30 minutes if you were stationary; if travelling out of your CJSOA into another you had to contact the ODB/ODA of the CJSOA you were travelling into/through and coordinate. There was no running amuck or being “cut loose”, all of our daily operations were planned, coordinated and executed with extreme detail. However, we did all of this within our CJSOA or between CJSOAs NOT through Bagram, Kabul or Khandahar. Everyone knew where the primary Firebase was for each CJSOA and who the ODB/ODA was and how to contact them for each CJSOA, so there were no issues; it was basic military planning and execution. We were always accountable and never autonomous, it was just that we were not micro-managed by staff personnel in Bagram, Khandahar or Kabul. We had to file daily sitreps, if we were out and unable to send up a written sitrep we had to and did always at least file a verbal sitrep; our opfund monies were accounted for via electronic means rather than requiring us to have to travel to Bagram or Khandahar in person, but we were held accountable and had to account for every penny. We were also accountable for all of our actions. Every mission had a debrief and reports submitted to Bagram outlining the mission’s results. We were held accountable, we just didn’t have to coordinate our every move with an entity “half a world away” in Bagram or Khandahar, the coordination took place locally. Mind you we had a LTC and several MAJs at our location, so it was not like Private Joe Snuffy was overseeing our activities…we had oversight. And if you did step on your crank…don’t worry you would get yanked back to reality and corrected. So this idea of running amuck in order to implement MAJ Gant’s “mindsets” and “strategies” is very perplexing to me. Why was it easier for us as well….there weren’t as many troops in country!!!!!!

Response 2:

I cannot disagree with you more on the risk-averse nature argument. Our armed forces will always go back for our fallen, we will never leave a man behind. For that very reason, a TET left flapping in a firefight will always take priority. That means an extraordinary investment of time, resources, and additional risk. If this aspect of the tactical situation is critical to your strategy, I can’t see it succeeding. Is it possible to work around this

–Here is my issue with this, we always planned and made sure we didn’t head into any situations in which we knew we were in over our head. We also never underestimated the might and fight of our enemy/adversary as well. If we were headed into a sticky situation we made certain we had the air support coordinated ahead of time, we always knew what the CAS and ECAS schedules were and planned accordingly; each and every team (CA, Intel, Psyop, ODA, etc. etc) had at least one person who had gone through training and was certified on ECAS. We had a mortar platoon at our location or if we didn’t have a mortar platoon the 18Bs still had mortars set up and the rest of us were trained on how to assist them when needed. When we travelled into hairier areas we took more firepower as needed…again I think our biggest thing was that everything was always planned and we never underestimated the bad guys. Because of that we were never flapping, everything was well thought out and planned, so when shit did hit the fan we were able to respond and make it through. It was never a fly by night kind of thing.

Response 3:

My question is whether you believe there are enough individuals with your level of qualifications and potential out there, and whether we can entice enough of them to the TETs to make this work?

–Again I see your paper MAJ Gant as much as a mindset more than a new tactic. Yes, there are plenty of us out there who have and can again implement your strategy and it can and HAS worked and most of us implementing your ideas in 2003 in Gardez were NOT operators we were CA, Psyops, Intel and an Infantry Platoon under the coordination and guidance of an ODB/ODA. My take on things is that we don’t have to reorganize or re-invent the wheel, we just need to change our mindset and how we interact with the Afghan people. The people on the ground now could in theory execute your strategy if they would just open up their minds!! Heaven forbid if we ponder the idea for a moment that not everything has to be done like we do things here in the USA.

Response 4:

I will lastly posit this question to you. If the fundamental consideration of the tribes is how they will continue to secure their safety and prosperity for the long-term, how can the TET concept compete with the Taliban/Al Qaeda strategy of omnipresent threat? As Bin Laden said, “People follow a strong horse.” If even in the long term of our strategy we’re able to assist the Afghans in their security, how can we ever really overcome the temptation of joining the Taliban if the Afghan population, as they certainly realize they must, is on the lookout for their safety in the long-term? I wonder, in (correctly) asserting that we can’t totally eradicate the Taliban, do we throw the baby out with the bathwater? We can’t “kill ‘em all”, but is there a valuable Psyop/Civil Affairs message projected by killing enough of them? Do we prove ourselves to be the strong horse? I hardly doubt such a strategy would be MORE effective than TETs, but I wonder if you feel a parallel effort would be a force multiplier or even as effective

–If the tribes/people of Afghanistan can get a moment of respite from fighting off “bad guys” they would be able to fend them off and not have to succumb to them in order to survive. Again it is a lack of understanding of the history of Afghanistan which leads to such questions above. Most Americans have no idea how the Russian invasion devastated Afghanistan and left it vulnerable and open to the Taliban and then Al-Qaeda. No you can’t and don’t need to kill them all you just need to help them get on their feet and not need the Taliban or Al-Qaeda to survive.

Last Thoughts:

One last thought, here is an example of how I think we are failing because we aren’t altering our mindset. A melting pot of a military will never be successful in Afghanistan because of the tribal society of Afghanistan throughout ALL of Afghanistan. Therefore, the Afghan military would likely be more successful if it were organized like our National Guard, where as each Province had a unit, and it was comprised of members from that province which is basically people from the local tribes securing their local area. So in each province you would have a commander which reported to a central commander in Kabul…again, just like our National Guard. But see, we expect everyone to have a National Army like ours…and it doesn’t necessarily have to be that way in order to still be successful. So I am not suggesting we totally scrap what we are or have done, just tweak it a bit, adjust the way in which we interact with the Afghans. To me this idea of organizing the army by provinces is such a simple and straight forward idea, but instead we will continue to force the square peg into the round hole instead…uggghhhh!!!!

First, thanks to you and Mr. Pressfield for picking mine out of all the responses that you could have used for material for posting on here.

You may claim that it is “almost impossible” to express yourself in this medium, but I think as you clarify on details you’re coming close to accomplishing it bit by bit. As we move toward what seems an inevitable troop surge, there is increased talk about the southern and eastern regions of the country and I think you, better than many, give a context that justifies it.

Risk aversion… wow, you nailed it. I agree with you 100% on the philosophy you put forth. I spent most of 2003 rolling around Tal Afar in a Humvee with more canvas than armor and no back plate in my vest (LT’s sucked up the shortages back then) and then rolled off the FOB near Tikrit once in 2005 in a four-wheeled submarine. I felt safer in ‘03. You could get “face time” with the people even while driving. Today we’re watching UAV feeds, three radios, Onstar, everything but the football game while driving around. I think most troops agree that whether it’s charging a hill with Sitting Bull the tribal chief or rolling out with Jim Gourley the intel weenie, you’ve got the same shot at coming home alive. Might as well try to accomplish your objectives while you’re at it. As you discuss though, the problem is getting the idea through the levels of command.

Part of the problem I discussed earlier revolves around the Army’s philosophy on “risk management”. I once wrote an e-mail to a friend regarding a particular aviation commander’s order to his Apache pilots not to fly lower than 1,000 feet above urban areas due to the risk of an anti-air missile. My comments were mistakenly forwarded to said aviation commander who proceeded to tell my commander that if I wanted to question his judgment, I might want to leave the safety of my cubicle first. I responded by asking how we justified sending soldiers into the cities if the threat to his pilots was too dangerous at 1,000 feet above them. You can imagine how well that went over.

Personal anecdote aside, this is the bigger philosophical hurdle we face. I find your questioning of whether you’re overestimating the American Soldier, in the context of the comment of one of your other respondents, a LTC no less, that you “underestimate the capabilities of the Army” to thus be ironic. If the Army is so capable, why do we hold ourselves back? Why do Rangers and SF Soldiers execute fastrope infils while soldiers at the 101st Airborne can’t get out of a helicopter until the ride has come to a safe and complete stop? I believe it is because commanders are hamstrung by risk-averse politicians who are hamstrung by a casualty-averse public. I don’t think this can be changed. To borrow from Mr. Pressfield, the concept of “phobos” is foreign to Americans. To Afghan tribesmen, it’s very internal and very real.

Ultimately, a big part of why you and yours can do the things you do without people fretting over injuries is that people don’t see it.

In considering the “safety net” for TETs being “interpersonal skills, courage, detailed planning, relationship-building skills and intelligence nets”, I think you’re discussing a need for a lot of depth in a broad range of skill sets. You lay out how you’ve had great success in finding a group of individuals to succeed at this before. There are also snags, and I appreciate your candor in not omitting that incident to buoy your position. I wonder that a dedicated TET program and the leaders it produces wouldn’t also have the same mixed bag of results when it comes to identifying talent? SFAS and Robin Sage are successful models, but they take months and time is not on our side at this point. At the same time, I hearken back to the astronaut analogy. NASA has given us John Glenn, and God bless ‘em for that. They also gave us a woman who drove halfway across the US in a diaper to kidnap someone with a BB gun. No program is air tight, but how much more risk is incurred when you condense the syllabus to crank out the end product?

When it comes to the BSO and the TET, we come from very different experiencs. You were a SOF BSO dealing with Conventional Force Visitors. I laugh just a little that you had no problems. I’m sure your higher headquarters were tearing their hair out as they tried to untangle the conventional guys who kept blundering into their way unannounced. On my side, things were pretty good for the guys outside the wire, but meanwhile the staff was tearing their hair out trying to figure out what the hell six black helicopters did in the middle of city X last night. Being a conventional guy, having watched conventional field grades discuss things on the conventional side of the wall, it is their convention to resent you, your funding, your beards, and you training. There may be an annual convention to grouse over these things.

Whether it’s sour grapes from guys who didn’t make it through SFAS, staff officers running low on sleep, out of dip, and on their last nerve, or a combination of other factors really doesn’t matter. There is another half to the equation for a butting of heads. I only ever met one SOF guy that acted like a real jerk in the middle of a planning session at a battalion headquarters. It was a minor operation, but that green beanie burned brighter than a star cluster. You know the result: SOF was shut down in that battalion’s battle space ever after. I wonder if astronauts have to go around affirming to people that no, they weren’t the one who wore the diaper.

I have a point to all of this. There was a time when SOF was working with the tribes, kicking tail and taking names. We were engaging directly and building relationships. T/AQ was on the run. Conventional forces did their vital job as the blunt instrument and conducted patrols, maintained presence, provided fire support and acted as the larger follow-on force to make sure SOF and their tribal forces didn’t miss anything as they continued to close distance and kill the enemy. That was in 2001-2002. So why can’t we go back to that?

Why take the time to resource and organize a TET program? Why produce these teams when they already exist? Why not put 6-man SOF teams, who already have the requisite skills, in with the necessary tribes, establish battalion-minus elements as the kinetic backup for the SOF TETs, and get down to business? A great deal of discussion today goes toward Obama’s troop surge versus Obama’s strategy, and how they have to match. I don’t believe you’re reinventing the wheel, but you are trying to repair a wheel that’s already turning and can’t be stopped. Would your “patch” be easier applied if the concept of what an SF team is capable of is already has traction with the ground commander?

And by the way, you made an ally out of me. Thanks.