Sam

I’ll be looking forward to hearing from you. Just read a piece titled “In the Quicksands of Somalia” by Bronwyn Bruton in the November/December edition of Foreign Affairs. While Afghanistan is certainly its own animal, Bruton illuminates some striking similarities between the two along the lines of tribalism.

Tribal conflict has played out in a unique and instructive way in Somalia since we left in 1993. Bruton asserts that, at present, no single alliance has the power to establish primacy among the innumerable conclaves of tribes, impoverished guns for hire, pirates, criminals and warlords. For all the talk about Al Shabab, Bruton proclaims that they’re a paper tiger. Meanwhile, tribalism has cut both ways– stymieing international efforts to create a central government as obstinately as it has rejected Al Qaeda’s inroads.

Bruton goes on to discuss his own views of a tribal approach from a less military-based perspective, but you may still find it interesting. Regardless, though it’s still troubling that a significant number of soldiers enlisting in “Jihad 2.0″ are Somalis who have immigrated to the US, and in some cases have returned to Somalia. But I hit upon a question before I reached his “way ahead” discussion.

If the tribal structures of Somalia and Afghanistan are equally inhospitable to either an American or Taliban/ Al Qaeda victory, is our most favorable endstate a permissive hunting ground? In other words, if we can’t stand Afghanistan up under a single, authoritative form of government (tribal, democratic, or otherwise), is it good enough that it becomes a place where we know who our friends are and stay at their house until we bag our limit, then let the next group come in for their hunting season?

I wonder if this is the best-case scenario for both the tribes and ourselves. For the Afghans, it would guarantee a regular, if diminished, US presence. For us, it succeeds in keeping T/AQ destabilized in Afghanistan while allowing us to continue the effort at a more sustainable OPTEMPO and cost. This would also cut down the manpower requirement to a number that our TETs could be supplied by the people who I think you believe really should be doing it– the SF teams. Would that work?

If nothing else, I think you’ll enjoy the reading. I’m sure you’ll be full of turkey by the time you read this, so I don’t expect a fast response, but it’s helpful to me in the formulation of a project I’m working on. Thanks and looking forward to your 3-pager!

Jim

Great post…I am writing back…I am on page three and have more to go. Will try to get it out today.

Thanks for your service…I cannot imagine doing what you are doing right. A BDE staff? Now, that takes a special skill set!

You have made me think, and that is what I want.

Will post a reply tonight hopefully.

STRENGTH AND HONOR

Jim

I’ve read your paper “One Tribe At a Time”. I appreciate your viewpoint from the foxhole of a decorated warrior who’s been “out in the fecal matter” and slogged through some of the worst combat action possible with your tribal brothers. However, there are a few points I’d like to challenge you on from the viewpoint of a (former) Infantry PL turned Brigade Intel Officer. Please consider this as loyal opposition, and only until I’m convinced by your presentation, at such time I’ll be a loyal ally.

To begin, I will state a few of my preconceived notions.

1- We’ll never get the GoA to function such that it can reasonably provide for the common defense, insure domestic tranquility, or establish justice. There will never be a sheriff in Afghanistan. Our best bet is to make sure all the gunfighters and horse thieves maintain parity.

2- We can never overcome the Afghan perception that they will outlast us, because even our new strategies still maintain getting out as the ultimate goal.

3- As Al Qaeda continues to franchise across southeast Asia and into Africa, the relative importance of Afghanistan diminishes, especially with regard to securing the United States against terrorist attacks.

With that said, I’ll begin. I immediately and whole-heartedly agree with you on the streamlining of the planning process, the need for “one call” philosophy of team support, and the change of ROE. However, the consequence I envision of this is the creation of a relationship between the fielded teams and the supporting higher headquarters that will become immediately and irrevocably adversarial. Teams would act virtually autonomously, be highly susceptible to suspicion of the headquarters and thus encouraged to be uncommunicative. Simultaneously, headquarters would lose information, have a poor field of vision on the battlefield, and be handicapped in its efforts to provide teams the instantaneous support that is needed. Meanwhile, the headquarters must maintain its own non-TET forces in order to accomplish other missions. How can a headquarters keep its battlespace coordinated when so many elements are “cut loose” from it? I understand that the tribes don’t come to OPORD briefings at Corps as it is, but I’ve been in more than one situation where SOF refused to cooperate or share information with a battlespace owner, and there’s no denying that there have been SOF SNAFUs in the past which caused local socio-political fallout. It’s hard to blame the man with the stars on his collar for being nervous when he’s going to be the one left holding the bag. What’s the balance between autonomy and accountability?

I cannot disagree with you more on the risk-averse nature argument. Our armed forces will always go back for our fallen, we will never leave a man behind. For that very reason, a TET left flapping in a firefight or a DUSTWUN will always take priority. That means an extraordinary investment of time, resources, and additional risk. If this aspect of the tactical situation is critical to your strategy, I can’t see it succeeding. Is it possible to work around this?

I draw a problematic connection between finding qualified officers and NCOs for the TETs, allowing the teams to “go tribal”, and the level of trust and power given to a team. Not without a little humor, I believe what you’re advocating is the creation of three new Special Forces Divisions. I think you’re asking for a group of men with a kind of stamina, quick thinking, patience and maturity found only in SOF and on a Space Shuttle. There haven’t been that many astronauts in our nation’s history, and the problems of the 18X program in “growing” more SF soldiers are well documented. You’ve been extremely successful in your endeavors. One could almost characterize you as “Lawrence of Arabia for the 21st Century”. Certainly it must be recognized that you’re a special individual. But if everyone had the same capabilities we wouldn’t think of you as special, and we’d probably have our TETs. My question is whether you believe there are enough individuals with your level of qualifications and potential out there, and whether we can entice enough of them to the TETs to make this work?

I will lastly posit this question to you. If the fundamental consideration of the tribes is how they will continue to secure their safety and prosperity for the long-term, how can the TET concept compete with the Taliban/ Al Qaeda strategy of omnipresent threat? As Bin Laden said, “People follow a strong horse.” If even in the long term of our strategy we’re able to assist the Afghans in their security, how can we ever really overcome the temptation of joining the Taliban if the Afghan population, as they certainly realize they must, is on the lookout for their safety in the long-term? I wonder, in (correctly) asserting that we can’t totally erradicate the Taliban, do we throw the baby out with the bathwater? We can’t “kill ‘em all”, but is there a valuable psyop/civil affairs message projected by killing enough of them? Do we prove ourselves to be the strong horse? I hardly doubt such a strategy would be MORE effective than TETs, but I wonder if you feel a parallel effort would be a force multiplier or even AS effective.

Thanks for your time. Best of luck to you in your travels and to Mr. Pressfield in nurturing further discussion.

Regards,
Jim Gourley