If the former, then an accommodation with the Taliban may be a means to that end; accommodations with strange perhaps unpalatable bedfellows are a fact of life in the global realpolitik. Could we live with the Taliban in Afghanistan if that meant no more (or significantly less probability of) 911, the Madrid train bombing, London tube bombings or the Bali bombing…? If we aspire to the the latter objective, then we have a problem because we are imposing what are fundamentally alien concepts on a nation that has essentially been in a state of anarchy since Christmas 1979.

Whatever the solution, I believe that the real problem is the lack of a common question in Afghanistan: what do we want to achieve there? The answer needs to be somewhat more precise than ‘world peace’.

1. Does the Chief have any hesitations or misgivings about relying on the U.S. in light of the experience of Poland, the Czechs and Honduras with this Administration? Notwithstanding the many fine members of the U.S. Armed Forces, can the Chief trust this Administration to keep its word?

2. What is his assessment of the Taliban? Are they absolutists? I.e., are they are irreconcilable with any, other form of government in Afghanistan and will not stop fighting until they are in complete control again? Is there any chance that the Taliban would be content to share power or exist under the authority of the traditional, tribal system?

3. What is his view (and the view of the tribes in general) of the Taliban? How popular are they? Have any members of the 11 Tribes of the Valley joined the Taliban? If so, do these people leave their homes and livelihoods to live and train with the Taliban armies or do they simply adopt the Taliban convictions and stay, cancer-like, among their neighbors? Is being Taliban more a way of life or is it a movement that one joins and becomes pulled deeper into?

4. Was General McChrystal wrong that the U.S., using its current….”non-strategy”, is failing or was he only wrong to publicly say so? Does the Chief feel like the U.S. can succeed in defeating the Taliban using its current approach (i.e., without the tribes) ?

5. How large of a force of Marines or U.S. Soldiers does the Chief believe is needed, for example in the Zazi Valley, for his TPF to fully defeat the enemy (Taliban/Warlords/Criminal Gangs) and bring lasting peace? Could his TPF prevail with only a small force (as contemplated by Major Gant’s SF team model) with access to air power/artillery? What type of force would be best suited to partner with his TPF? In the recent Nuristan attack, for example, it appears that the Taliban/AQ massed as many as 300 fighters to attack the U.S. COP. It is certain that the Taliban would try to overwhelm the TPF in similar fashion. What would he need to withstand this? (And then, depending on the Chief’s answer, is it realistic for the U.S. to bring those assets to bear all over Afghanistan, for every TPF? How would that work?)

TO GENE: Good question about preventing corruption. Only real way to do so in a free society is this– KEEP IT LOCAL. If the U.S. took Chief Zazai’s approach and worked from the tribal level up, instead of from the top down, corruption would largely disappear, at least in its most pernicious forms. If the U.S. by-passed the national government in Kabul and, instead, directed the lion share of its economic aid to the U.S. commanders in each province (or even to the battallion commanders), that would solve much of the problem. These commanders would have very broad discretion (as Major Gant suggests) to spend that money in their AO as seems best based on the needs of their locality. This gives these commanders important influence with the tribes and builds confidence with the tribes that siding with the U.S. brings tangible benefits. This was done to great effect by the Marines in Iraq.

If you look at the work that Tim Lynch is doing in Afghanistan (http://blog.freerangeinternational.com ), amazing things can happen when government bureaucracy gets out of the way. Corruption thrives based upon the number of people involved in any process. If, for example, a sewage system has to be built in a village at a cost of $1 Million, the potential for corruption (and cost overruns) depends directly upon how many people are involved in that project. If the contractor has to get permission from a national entity, then a provincial entity and then a local entity, that is three levels with hands out demanding payment. If the ANA or ANP is brought in for security, they will demand part of the money. If, on the other hand, we by-pass all of the bureacracy and allow the local U.S. commander to partner with the tribal Chief to get the sewage system built, it is a huge win-win all around: opportunity for corruption is almost nil because there are no layers of bureaucracy to go through and the village gets to employ many people in building the project and providing security. Again, I refer everyone to Tim Lynch’s site for example after example of how he has been doing this very thing in partnership with the local tribes, and doing so without ANY security from U.S./ISAF forces. He relies, instead on the tribes and his own, small team of experts.

When you think of it, there are very few things that cannot be done at the local level. Americans have this strange prejudice that there must be a large organization in place to get anything done.

TO SJPONEILL: re creation of “Taliban TPF’s”. I am very interested in Chief Zazai’s take on this. My impression from everything I have read about the Taliban during their reign of terror in the 90’s and what they are saying now (and who they align themselves with as well) is that their leadership is fundamentally irreconcilable. There may be some portion who are essentially “Rent-A-Taliban”… in it for the money and not true believers, but the insurgency is driven by a fanatical leadership. In other words, forming a “Taliban TPF” would be like forming a Fox TPF to guard a hen-house. It is part and parcel of the Taliban philosophy that their strict view of Islam and ONLY their strict view should govern. There is no ground for compromise with any, other form of governance, whether it is tribal, or democratic or monarchical, etc… It is impossible to suppose that a Taliban TPF would actually fight against other insurgent Taliban or AQ.

Cheif Zazai’s point about the negativism of many of GEN McCrystal’s statements is spot on and while he may be trying to shape the domestic audience he is also providing ammo for the Taliban’s own IO machine…

I would ask you if we are doing anything different to the Taliban in Afghanistan where we are trying to enforce Western values on a non-Western culture. What we so righteously look down on as corruption is, in many parts of the world, just a means of doing business – look at the BAe scandal in the UK a few weeks ago – what do you do: grease a few wheels or say bye-bye to billions worth of contract with a commensurate hit on UK jobs and economy, knowing full well that some other company, less scrupulous, will just wing in and take the order any way…

In terms of allowing a Taliban to join a TPF – why not create a Taliban TPF – it may be the lesser of the evils and a method of bringing the Taliban to the table – could we live with a Taliban Afghanistan if it was AG-free?

What is to prevent corruption in the Tribal Police Force? On a grandeur scale, how does one successfully prevent corruption in any governing body? How does Cheif Zazai propose to eliminate corruption in a way that is any different from what other leaders may have tried but failed.

I may be wrong, but as I see it, a Taliban is a member of a tribe. If that is true, is there room on the Tribal Police Force for a Taliban? If not, how does one prevent a Taliban from enlisting in a Tribal Police Force?