Comments on: “One Tribe at a Time”

By: Reference: One Tribe at a Time by Steven Pressfield « Public Intelligence Blog

Fri, 18 Dec 2009 15:01:48 +0000

[...] One Tribe At A Time,” #1 var addthis_pub = ”; var addthis_language = ‘en’;var addthis_options = ‘email, favorites, digg, delicious, myspace, google, facebook, reddit, live, more’; Dec 18 [...]

By: RayB

RayB — Thu, 03 Dec 2009 14:50:00 +0000

This is an excellent article. I have to disagree with Shukri, I do not believe that we have to submit to the will of the Afghan tribes. There is a common bond that is developed by shared experience. You do not have to speak the language as tone and body language conveys a message loud and clear to even the youngest member of the group. I heard the words trust and faith often used when coalition forces talked about the afghan. I was an Embedded Trainer in 2006 (ETT, 2nd Kandak, 1st Brigade, 203rd Corp) and the American soldiers that I spoke with often found it hard to believe that my ANA did not immediately trust them. How could I tell, my ANA would never send just one squad with just any unit. They always sent at least two. Once they got to know the soldiers then in some cases they would send one squad but it took time to develop the relationship.
This is a proud people, with many tribes of different ethnic backgrounds who are able to tell by physical features, method of dress and by name who you belong too. In the end we can find a common ground, most people are concerned about their family doing as well if not better. We have to focus on improving the infrastructure, food, water and shelter. The point on OPFUND (money) issue is vital to improving the infrastructure. The points on CONOP approval process, Rules of Engagement (ROE) and method of dress (“American tribesmen”) all go to the issue of security for the team that will mitigate some but not all of the risk (risk-averse nature). I agree that the conventional army does not like those things that are different. However, if we really want to change the way of life in remote lands, then we have to be willing to convince people of another way and that does not happen in a short time frame. It is not the current generation that we have to change it is the next, those children in the streets are our best hope.

By: Shukri

Shukri — Wed, 02 Dec 2009 19:41:29 +0000

The strategy proposed above by Major Gant would be successful except for one thing. It requires the US to submit to the will of the Afghan tribes. This will never happen as long as the US is an independent nation.

By: Ron Braithwaite

Ron Braithwaite — Mon, 05 Oct 2009 00:55:28 +0000

I think Major Gant’s observations are excellent–potential war winners. Yes, acquisition of suitable personnel may be difficult but is doable. Yes, mlitary bureaucracy is traditionally ‘hidebound’, as are most bureaucracies, but resistance can be overcome.

One problem, probably presently insurmountable, is political. There is simply no way that the present Administration would permit these American Afghanis the ‘broadest possible latitude,’ and such latitude would be essential for the program to work.

At one level…because lower troop levels might be possible…Gant’s proposals might be attractive to our present Administration. On another level, however, the Obamistas…should they even momentarily consider such a program…would place so many operational restrictions on such teams as to greatly reduce ther effectiveness, and likely get them killed. For example, it might be necessary at times to ‘lean’ on a suspect i.e. to fight in traditional Afghan fashion. Considering that the Administration has shown a keen interest in prosecuting CIA officers for similar actions, it is highly unlikely that they would give such teams appropriate support.

By: Jim Gant (Jim's son)

Jim Gant (Jim's son) — Fri, 02 Oct 2009 20:07:54 +0000

Dad,

I know! I know! Everyone has told me that. Even Steve told me that!

Love

Kirk

I AM MY FATHER’S KEEPER

By: Jim Gant ( Jim's dad

Jim Gant ( Jim's dad — Fri, 02 Oct 2009 19:37:20 +0000

Major Gant,

Nobody cares about your shit!

Love

Dad

I AM MY SON’S KEEPER

By: Douglas A Franklin

Douglas A Franklin — Fri, 02 Oct 2009 15:04:36 +0000

This is a fascinating article. I was a Captain in the initial attack into Iraq, this was something we were experimenting with while I was in OIF1, working with tribesmen and clan leaders. I think that this is one of the first times I have seen it so clearly described. Much of what the Major is saying is already Text book doctrine, unfortunately a few hundred pages long. The problem is I think I and only a few others have actually ready the book, everyone else is reinventing the wheel.

My Brigade Commander’s answer (1BCT 4ID (the ones who got Sadam)) doctrinally correct answer to the Iraqi and Foreign insurgents was “Detailed Route Reconnaissance” in force, and on foot along every major road; inspecting culverts and likely ambush sites in detail. He called it “Detailed Route Reconnaissance” and everyone knew what he was talking about. We also used random timing intervals along all major US routes. Our engineers literally took turns honoring good behavior among troops by giving them a throw at a dart board and the number struck represented the time the patrol went out on that day of the week. The enemy could not predict when the next patrol would arrive and we destroyed many IED teams. The result was for a period of about 6 and a half months where we, and every unit, that passed through our sector took ZERO IED casualties. We simply intercepted and destroyed every IED and ambush before they could initiate, against friendly troops.

One of my few frustrations with the Army while I was active was that there were so many brilliant people who worked hard and applied their experience to our development of Doctrine but so few others who actually read and then understood it, let alone applied it. All Doctrine really is, is a common language so everyone knows the mission, after only a few words. I’m glad the Major made the effort to publish this, hopefully it will find its way into enough planners reading material that they begin to apply these hard earned lessons.

Thank you for you time gentlemen.

Douglas A Franklin
CPT, IN
IRR

By: S.Tabriz

S.Tabriz — Fri, 02 Oct 2009 02:56:40 +0000

I agree with Major Gant’s assertions. We must act with a significantly smaller footprint (I am concerned with recent reports of possibily increasing the number of troops in Afghanistan by 40,000). We need to reach out and understand these people by tribe – if we attempt to force our own values and morals, we will only drive them further away from our cause. We must find a way to make our cause their cause and vice versa. I look forward to this paper’s future installations.

By: KellyC

KellyC — Wed, 30 Sep 2009 17:43:25 +0000

Wisner’s comments are right on. Gen. McChrystal comes from special forces; let’s hope that he’s already thinking this way.

While I agree with the ‘light footprint’ model that Maj. Gant espouses, I do think that a larger footprint will be required along the border with Pakistan until Pakistan itself is truly in control of their own frontier areas.

By: wisner

wisner — Tue, 29 Sep 2009 16:04:25 +0000

I hope Maj. Gant’s paper gets some play up the chain of command. This is why Specail Forces was made. SF and Special Operation Forces proved their ability in the begining of this war. Why not let them do it again? It seems that everyone has fallen in love with the Direct Action aspect of SF/SOF. There is only one group designated as counterinsurgency experts…SF. Here you have a ground commander and a home grown tribal cheif and movement moving towards the goal of stabilization and I wonder if anyone is listening?