Comments on: Tribes in Afghanistan: A Guest Post from Michael Yon

By: Joe

Joe — Sun, 09 Aug 2009 06:55:30 +0000

I think after this drags on a little longer we will probably cut and run as the perception is that we cannot afford the expense of maintaining a presence on the other side of the globe indefinitely.

The sheep don’t understand problems that don’t directly and immediately pertain to them, especially in dire economic situations. 10 years of war is a tough pill to swallow, and if we finish things up nicely in Iraq, we will be there for a great many years, able to project power from bases in Iraq and consequently have a bit of leverage over the middle eastern oil markets in a time of “peak oil.”

Nah, this time, in these here hinterlands, we let Geronimo (aka OBL) spend his last days among his people, rather than chase him down.

By: Gordon Daugherty

Gordon Daugherty — Sat, 08 Aug 2009 00:28:28 +0000

Wisner–besides all that don’t forget Alexander married Roxanne. Maybe we should ask Rick and some of his SF pals to settle down out there.

Re the idea of obtaining the tribes’ loyalty: seems to me it’s a zero-sum game; elevating or enhancing the leader of one tribe automatically puts someone else’s tribe at a relative disadvantage or loss of local influence, hence a potential enemy. Playing them off, balancing their relative strengths–this strikes me as something the US won’t take the time to do.

Finally, spending a century or so making Afghanistan into, say, Sri Lanka doesn’t seem to be in our interest. We should have something like the post-Civil War cavalry in the West, keeping control of our enemies in defined zones and letting the locals live as they wish. This strikes me as doable and realistic.

By: Rick

Rick — Fri, 07 Aug 2009 16:44:33 +0000

You bring up some good points. However, I think that you have it backwards. The question isn’t whether these tribes want to be connected or represented in Kabul. It is how can we influence them to want to be connected to the government in Kabul. This is done by offering incentives. These aren’t always monetary (but usually are). Most tribal heads look to maintain their influence. After that, they look how they can expand their influence. We aren’t talking about the world stage in most cases. You have to remember that this is truly a cut throat society. No matter how good a leader is, he has to look out for himself and his first and foremost, or he will be displaced by a more wily adversary. Our ideas of graft and corruption are vastly different than what the Afghan reality is. I have spent several tours understanding this. Sometimes you have to pick the least corrupt guy to back. Other times you have to side with the guys that can give you what you want. Either way, we need to focus on engaging the various tribal elders from a position of strength. This means that we need to be in a position to elevate their monetary and influential status, if they follow the lead of the government in Kabul. This will provide the incentive to connect and defer to the government in Kabul, as well as give prestige and influence to said government. To simplify this, just think of the Sopranos. “What can I do for you Vinny”? “Don Guido, I want into the organization. I have a job planned and need your help”. “OK. It’ll cost you 30%”. “For 30% what do I get”? “You get top cover should you get pinched, and you don’t have to worry about my guys getting in your way”. “OK. 30%. sounds fair”. This is the way business is done in Afghanistan. Our government needs to realize this and accept it. If we want to change this, it will take an un-acceptable amount of time and resources. This is just the humble opinion of a grunt, knuckle dragging Special Forces guy with a few tours under his belt.

By: Jim Carrozza

Jim Carrozza — Fri, 07 Aug 2009 15:19:00 +0000

Do the outlying tribes want to be connected to Kabul? Is it desirable for them to be represented in Kabul? Can their status in the world be enhanced by a connection to the capital of Afghanistan? I’m not sure we know the answers to these questions right now. As it stands right now, this part of the world is an excellent place from which to conduct business if you’re running a terrorist organization. No one has captured Bin Laden and no one seems to be eager to turn him in either. Bin Laden seems to have hit on the right recipe for a safe haven, and we talk about decades for any real changes to take hold. My guess is that the best we can hope for, is a kind of containment. Seems like cold comfort. Nearly 10 years into it and our best hope is that maybe his recruits will start to run dry. Desperation has been a fertile soil from which to grow these raw recruits in the past. If some of the despair could be replaced with hope and stability, we might see a change. We’re talking years here, anyway you cut it.

By: Wisner

Wisner — Fri, 07 Aug 2009 13:42:16 +0000

Indeed lucky to have Michael guest post. The big question is does the West want to invest that much time and money into Afghanistan? Machiavelli tells us that in order to maintain a land that is foregin in language, culture and laws, the invader/conqueror must set up his capitol there, have the king live there or send his people to settle and colonize there. I don’t see any of that happening. What are the alternatives?