I think you are missing a few things here…the most important being that I wrote this book, my thoughts and all, in the sequence that they happened. So, for example, you take me to task for the opening chapter after Jason Heidbreder is shot. Yes, I wanted the tanks to race up to the house the patrol went firm in and I couldn’t understand, at that moment, why Cobra 6 would not send them. However, you are leaving out a key point, pg. 16 at the top Cobra 6 explains to me why he did what he did, in a very similar fashion as you…funny enough…and I follow it with “My earlier doubts about this man’s judgment were instantly erased.” So why you are taking me to task for something that I admit in the book is somewhat surprising to me….

Yes, I would rather walk than ride in a vehicle in Ramadi. Did I recognize that seven minutes into the company’s first patrol: no.

The fact that I say Captain Smith’s leadership enabled the Awakening in the acknowledgments is my opinion. I will not explain that to you or anyone else. Read chapters 10-14 if you want to know why I feel that way.

Pg. 70, me pulling out the grenade. I won’t even try to convince you that we were shot at, because, from the extensive view inside your tank, you are calling me a liar. I understand that my perception is not always reality. I think you should consider the same. However, again I agree with you that I should not have pulled out the grenade. Surely, you read this as it is a mere paragraph away from my description of the event, pg. 72, “I came to the realization that I was reacting to a confusing situation with poor judgment.”

So, what you aim to achieve by hammering me for events that I admit I misjudged is somewhat perplexing to me. In fact, you are making my point in the first eight chapters of this book. Conventional warfare against insurgents results in this: uncertainty, confusion, bad judgment. This is directly compared against the final chapters, in which, we begin to combine our conventional ops with those of ex-insurgents. Look at the results in those chapters, the differences in our missions, planning, etc…that is the point of the book.

I guess it takes a rambo 2nd Lt. to point that out.

As anyone who was downtown would feel after about 2 days in that hell-hole, you would FEEL SAFER WALKING than in a combat vehicle. Yes, having both is best, yes, at the moment of explosion of an IED it is safer in a vehicle, unless it’s right under you! Combat vehicles draw IEDs, especially in the city, walking was pretty safe, with the notable exception of your first day out of Grant, I don’t think you took any more casualties with us. But, then you add, “we all knew a tank could drive over these concrete barriers with no problem” you only succeed in showing how ignorant of tanks you are. I’ve been a tanker for years, but I PARKED MY TANK and patrolled with you on the objective. You risk throwing track and doing that in a MEDEVAC may be warranted you might say. But doing it on Vic Mackey would be like inviting a million vultures to a downed zebra: NOT SMART LIEUTENANT. You may feel justifiably proud of yourself for volunteering to serve your country and getting a big shot to promo your book. But you and your couple of months in Ramadi do not make you the heroes who “enabled the Al-Anbar Awakening” YOUR WORDS, not mine. I’m betting CPT Smith would not approve. The F/2-4 Marines I witnessed were the ones who mark everything a PIED and got your company be pulled out of combat for automatically opening fire on anything called a “raid”. Rage Company was full of brave Marines. You exaggerate their contribution and GREATLY exaggerate several of the stories in your book. I was only THERE (meaning IN YOUR PATROLS) for about 3 of those, but ALL of those 3 you have made much more dramatic than they actually were. In fact, I was in the tank on page 70. If I had known you were pulling out a grenade, I would have dismounted to tackle you. We didn’t take any enemy fire all night and I was escorting your company down Baseline. The fire was from outside of our BN AO, not even close to impacting near our friendlies, but came most likely from other friendly units, not knowing you can RANGE THE WHOLE CITY with an M4. If you were pulling out grenades and looking at the rooftops, it shows you were still green at that time and misperceived what was going on around you. I’m sorry to lay it out there like that, but you have some serious growing up to do. I appreciate that you want to be famous and dramatizing every mission by saying things like “tonight was going to be different” will get you down that road, but you have your facts wrong son. And I will offer that opinion to anyone out there who asks me, and several already have. I still remember F/2-4’s motivation and bravery fondly, but this book, while it seems to be your honest opinion, is not written with an eye for anything higher than a 2LT with Rambo aspirations.

Anything I’ve ever written regarding our accomplishments has been about the company, not me as an individual. I urge you to read the book.

Semper Fi,

Tom

2/4’s time in Ramadi was wasteful. We did discover a few weapons cache’s and killed REAL insurgents, but the number of innocent killed was probably higher. Unfortunately quite a few boneheads were just trigger happy. Captain Smith (Fox CO) appeared “lost” for most of the time, and cared more for his vehicles than his Marines. While some lessons can be taken from Iraq, Afghanistan is a total different animal. The Karzai government is grossly corrupt and the US contract money is not making its way to where its supposed to go. But the root of the problem is that there is little alternative for poor young people in the Muslim world to turn to (other than joining hardline religious groups). Also, in many instances we won the support of the local shieks in Ramadi through large cash incentives.

You are right, 3/8 Marines AO did extend all the way to southern Ramadi. With 300 Infantrymen amongst a population of 150,000 they didn’t control much. This is why 2-28 launched an operation to seize the southern half of south-central Ramadi and create a new AO for one of it’s organic units (what would become your AO in 06). When we, as a coalition, failed to gain a foothold we decided to “isolate” the region rather than contest it. This action is what allowed an insurgent safe haven to remain there until 1/1 AD arrived.

I think you will enjoy the first four chapters of the book, it opens with a firefight around COP Grant, Operation Harrison Creek 1 (Papa 8, 9, 19 patrol sectors) Op HC 2 (Papa 10), and Operation Windmill Point (Lima).

Semper Fi,

Tom

As for the Guard not being able to play in the big leagues, don’t know that I agree. Same training, same equipment, same mission – when mobilized for overseas contingency operations. Like any other military unit, the Guard brings certain skills to the fight, and also have some of the same issues as any other military organization. Some units do very well, others not so well. Can’t paint it all with the Guard vs. Active Duty hubris and who is better than whom. Agreed, long term use of the Guard as an operational reserve is taxing, and stresses the force. We are Citizen Soldiers. We also still have the other missions Dan mentions. But until things change, looks like we are driving on.